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ABSTRACT
ON MODELING AND MITIGATING NEW BREED OF DOS ATTACKS
by
Amey Bhaskar Shevtekar

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks pose serious threats to the Internet, exerting in
tremendous impact on our daily lives that are heavily dependent on the good health of
the Internet. This dissertation aims to achieve two objectives: 1) to model new
possibilities of the low rate DoS attacks; 2) to develop effective mitigation mechanisms
to counter the threat from low rate DoS attacks.
A new stealthy DDoS attack model referred to as the "quiet" attack is proposed in
this dissertation. The attack traffic consists of TCP traffic only. Widely used botnets in
today's various attacks and newly introduced network feedback control are integral part
of the quiet attack model. The quiet attack shows that short-lived TCP flows used as
attack flows can be intentionally misused. This dissertation proposes another attack
model referred to as the perfect storm which uses a combination of UDP and TCP.
Better CAPTCHAs are highlighted as current defense against botnets to mitigate the
quiet attack and the perfect storm.
A novel time domain technique is proposed that relies on the time difference
between subsequent packets of each flow to detect periodicity of the low rate DoS
attack flow. An attacker can easily use different IP address spoofing techniques or
botnets to launch a low rate DoS attack and fool the detection system. To mitigate such
a threat, this dissertation proposes a second detection algorithm that detects the sudden
increase in the traffic load of all the expired flows within a short period. In a network

rate DoS attacks, it is shown that the traffic load of all the expired flows is less than
certain thresholds, which are derived from real Internet traffic analysis. A novel filtering
scheme is proposed to drop the low rate DoS attack packets. The simulation results
confirm attack mitigation by using proposed technique. Future research directions will
be briefly discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective
The objective of this dissertation is to achieve two goals: 1) to evaluate the threat of the
low rate Denial of Service (DoS) attack and develop effective mitigation mechanisms to
counter the low rate DoS attacks, and 2) to model new possibilities of the low rate DoS
attacks.

1.2 Background Information

Figure 1.1 The trend of DDoS attacks in the Internet.
Internet has been plagued by a variety of security threats over the past several years. The
DDoS attacks received hype after 2000 when yahoo.com was attacked. After that event,

1

2
DDoS attacks have been rampaging in the Internet frequently. A famous website [1] has
been keeping track of DDoS related news since long time. A tremendous amount of work
has been done in the industry and academia to mitigate DDoS attacks, but none have been
able to eradicate them successfully. The motivations for launching attacks have also been
shifted significantly. Initially, they were for publicity but now they are for economic or
political incentives. Thus, DDoS attacks are a complex problem to mitigate.
Figure 1.1 depicts the trend of DDoS attacks in the Internet. The x-axis indicates
the efficiency of the attack, indicating how much damage it can cause to the good traffic.
The y-axis indicates the detectability of the attack, indicating the exposure of the attack to
defense systems. The early brute force attacks relied on sending high rate attack traffic
continuously to a website. They are now easily detected because there have been many
defense systems that can distinguish such anomalous attack traffic [2]. The shrew attack
and RoQ attack are the new low rate DoS attacks that are difficult to detect as compared
to the brute force attack, but they primarily affect only long-lived TCP traffic. One major
contribution of this dissertation is to forewarn and model the emerging sophisticated
attacks, namely, the quiet attack and the perfect storm. Such attacks have higher impact
on good traffic and yet they are evasive. This Chapter will briefly discuss old brute force
attacks, and then introduce recent low rate DoS attacks.

1.3 Old Brute Force Attacks
A DoS attack is defined as an attack that causes a network or a computer incapable of
providing service to the users [2]. It typically targets the bandwidth of the victim. A
DDoS attack is defined as an attack that uses multiple unwilling computers to send the

3

attack traffic to the victim. A DDoS attack is more lethal since it has a large capacity to
send attack traffic as compared to a DoS attack. These attacks are also refereed to as
brute force attacks as they send attack traffic at high rates and lack characteristics
required to be stealthy. There are several types of brute force DDoS attacks that have
been reported in the literature, and a few of commonly used attacks are described below.
The DDoS attacks can be characterized as shown in Figure 1.2 [21.

Figure 1.2 Classification of DDoS attacks.

Classification of DDoS attacks can be classified by the degree of automation, i.e., the
level of sophistication of the attack mechanism. Earlier attacks were manual, and were
improved gradually. In a manual attack [2], the victims are scanned for a particular
vulnerability which is exploited to gain access into the victim's system by the attacker.
An attacker would then use commands to control the victim during the attack. In a semiautomatic attack, some steps of the attack procedure, which were originally manually
performed become automated, for example, some of the victims are compromised to act
as attack agents who coordinate the attack by issuing commands to conceal the identity of
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the attacker even if the attack is detected [2]. The attack agents are pre-programmed with
the necessary required commands during the attack by an attacker. All the recent attacks
are highly automatic requiring minimal communication between the attacker and the
compromised machines once the attack is launched. All the attack steps are preprogrammed and delivered as a payload to infect clients, also referred to as zombies or
bots. Some new attack payloads, which fail to detect a specific vulnerability in a victim
machine, will automatically scan for another vulnerability in the same machine. Recent
botnet attacks on Estonia's websites employed fully automated mechanisms [1]. Botnet is
a network of bots or zombies controlled by a botmaster [3].
Classification of DDoS attacks based on an exploited vulnerability takes into
account property of the network or the protocol used in the attack. The category to which
the flood attack belongs is the simplest of all categories in which an attacker relies on
denying the network bandwidth to the legitimate users. The common example of this
category is the UDP flood attack [4]. In a UDP flood, attacker sends UDP packets at a
high rate to the victim so that the network bandwidth is exhausted. UDP is a
connectionless protocol so it is easy to send UDP packets at any rate in the network.
Another attack in this category is the ICMP echo flood; it involves sending many ICMP
echo request packets to a host. The host replies with an ICMP echo reply to each of the
two ICMP echo request packet, and many such requests and reply packets fill up the
network bandwidth.
In the category of amplification attack, an attacker exploits a protocol property
such that few packets will lead to amplified attack traffic. The SMURF attack exploits the
ICMP protocol [5] and it falls in this category. It involves forging a source IP address of
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the ICMP echo request packet with the address of the victim. The destination address of
the ICMP echo request is the broadcast address of the LAN or so-called directed
broadcast addresses. On receiving such a packet, each active host on a LAN responds an
ICMP echo reply packet to the victim. Typically, a LAN has many active hosts, and so a
tremendous amount of attack traffic is generated to cripple the victim. To avoid such an
attack, most system administrators are advised to disable the directed broadcast
addresses.
In the category of protocol exploit, again a property of the protocol is exploited.
The SYN attack [6] exploits the TCP protocol's three way handshake mechanism. Web
servers use port 80 to accept incoming HTTP traffic that runs on top of the TCP protocol.
When users wants to access a webpage, it sends a SYN packet to the web server's open
port 80. The web server does not know the user's IP address before the arrival of the
SYN packet. The server, upon receipt of a SYN packet, sends a SYN/ACK packet and
thus puts the connection in the LISTEN state. A legitimate user's machine replies to the
web server's SYN/ACK packet with an ACK packet and establishes the connection.
However, if the SYN packet has been sent from an attack machine which does not
respond to the server with an ACK packet, the web server never gets an ACK packet and
the connection remains incomplete. Every web server has a finite amount of memory
resources to handle such incomplete connections. The main goal of the SYN attack is to
exhaust the finite amount of memory resources of a web server by sending a large
number of SYN packets. Such an attack causes the web server to crash. Other similar
protocol exploit attack example is PUSH + ACK attack [7] is another example falling in
this category.
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In the category of malformed packet attack, the packet header fields are modified
to instigate a crash of the operating system of the receiver. An IP packet having the same
source and destination IP address is a malformed packet [2]. In another kind of
malformed packet attack, the IP options fields of the IP header are randomized, and the
type of service bit is set to one. Ping of death attack involves sending a ping packet larger
than the maximum IP packet size of 65535 bytes [8]. Historically, a ping packet has a
size of 56 bytes, and most of the systems cannot handle ping packets of larger size.
Operating systems take more time to process such unusual packets, and has a large
quantity of such packets can crash the systems.
DDoS attacks can also be classified by their attack rates, namely, continuous vs.
variable. Likewise, they can also be classified by their impacts: disruptive vs. degrading.
Disruptive attacks aims for denial of service while degrading attacks aim for reduction of
quality. Examples of the class of degrading attacks are discussed in more details in the
next Section. This dissertation includes the evaluation of the effects of degrading attacks
as well as schemes proposed to detect them.

1.4 Low Rate DoS Attacks
As mentioned before, the security in the Internet is increasingly challenging as more
professionals are getting into this lucrative business. An article in the New York Times
[9] describes one such business of selling the software exploits. Attacks are also getting
more sophisticated, as the attackers are not merely interested in achieving publicity. The
shrew attack is one such intelligent attack, which was first reported in [10], followed by a
series of variants [11]-[15]. This study considers these attacks as low rate DoS attacks. It
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is typically illustrated by a periodic waveform shown in Figure l.2., where T is the time
period, t is the burst period, and R is the burst rate.

Figure 1.3 An example of a generic low rate DoS attack pattern.

A shrew attack exploits widely implemented minimum RTO [16] property of the TCP
protocol. The following characterize the low rate TCP DoS attack:
•

It sends periodic bursts of packets at one-second interval.

•

The burst rate is equal to or greater than the bottleneck capacity.

•

The burst period is tuned to be equal to the round-trip times of the TCP
connections; this parameter determines whether the attack will cause DoS
to the TCP connections with small or long round trip times.

•

The exponential back off algorithm of the TCP's retransmission
mechanism is eventually exploited.
In a Reduction of Quality of Service (RoQ) attack [11], the attacker sends high

rate short bursts of the attack traffic at random time periods, thereby forcing the adaptive
TCP traffic to backoff due to the temporary congestion caused by the attack bursts. In
particular, the periodicity is not well defined in a RoQ attack, thus allowing the attacker
to keep the average rate of the attack traffic low in order to evade the regulation of
adaptive queue management like RED and RED-PD [17[419]. By sending the attack
traffic, the RoQ attack introduces transients and restricts the router queue from reaching
the steady state. The open knowledge of these stealthy attacks presses for early fixes. For
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simplicity, from now on, the term "low rate DoS attack" refers to both the shrew and
RoQ attack, unless otherwise stated as shown in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.4 Low rate DoS attacks: a) shrew attack, and b) RoQ attack.

The attacker can also use different types of IP address spoofing to evade several
other detection systems. Owing to the open nature of the Internet, IP address spoofing can
still evade ingress and egress filtering techniques at many sites [20]. A low rate DoS
attack can use IP address spoofing in a variety of ways like random IP address spoofing
and continuous IP address spoofing [18]. The use of lP address spoofing most
importantly divides the high rate of a single flow during the burst period of the attack
among multiple flows with spoofed identities. This way, an attacker can evade detection
systems that concentrate on finding anomalous traffic rate. The detection systems that
rely on identifying periodicity of the low rate DoS attack in the frequency domain can
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detect the periodicity, but they fail to filter the attack traffic as it is difficult to know the
IP addresses that an attacker will use in the future.
This problem is further exacerbated by the use of botnets; a botnet is a network of
compromised real hosts across the Internet controlled by a master [3]. As an attacker
using botnets has control over thousands of hosts, it can easily use these hosts to launch a
low rate DoS attack; this is analogous to a low rate DoS attack that uses random or
continuous IP address spoofing. Now, with the use of botnets, the IP addresses of hots are
not spoofed and so these packets cannot be filtered by spoofing prevention techniques. In
fact, these attack packets are similar to the HTTP flows. This random and continuous IP
address spoofing problem described above is unique to the low rate DoS attacks, and is
different from other types of DDoS attacks. These attacks [11] can be launched at any
routers in the Internet; the edge routers can be easy targets as their capacities are small,
and hence attackers can easily incite denial of service to the VoIP users traversing those
routers. Low rate DoS attacks fall in the DDoS attack category of variable attack rate and
degrading impact.

1.5 Defenses for Brute Force Attacks
Mitigating DDoS attacks is a widely studied problem and some of the popular approaches
are described below. Defense systems can be broadly classified based on their functions.
There are four main categories of defense systems: intrusion prevention, intrusion
detection, intrusion response, and intrusion mitigation [2].
Intrusion prevention systems prevent an attack from occurring. Ingress and egress
filtering control IP address spoofing being used in the attack. Ingress filtering only allows
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packets destined for the source network to enter the network, thereby filtering all other
packets. It is implemented at the edge routers of the network, and it limits the attack
traffic entering the network. Egress filtering is an outbound filter that allows only packets
with source IP addresses originated from the source network to exit the source network.
Use of egress filtering controls attack traffic going to destination networks [21].
Disabling IP broadcasts prevents smurf attacks. Honeypots are network decoys [22].
They allow studying attack behavior before the onset of an attack. Honeypots act as early
warning systems. Honeypots mimic all aspects of a real network like web server and,
mail server to lure attackers. The primary goal of the honeypots is to determine/derive the
exploit mechanism of the attack in order to build defense signatures against the exploit.
Intrusion prevention systems cannot completely prevent an attack, but they contain the
damage of the attack. They allow building better defense systems by studying the attack.
Intrusion detection systems detect an attack based on attack signatures or
anomalous behaviors. Snort is a popular signature based network intrusion detection
systems [23]. It performs protocol analysis and content matching to passively detect a
variety of attacks like buffer overflows, port scans, and web application attacks. Snort
uses Berkeley's libpcap library to sniff packets. It uses a chain structure to maintain rules.
The header of each chain is a tuple of source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, and destination port. Various rules are then attached to the header so that packet
information is matched to a header and corresponding rules to detect an intrusion.
Anomaly detection systems rely on detecting shift in the normal traffic patterns of
the network. A system based on SNMP MIB variables use statistical techniques to detect
network anomalies [24]. A network management system is widely deployed in the
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Internet and is effectively used for intrusion detection. Consider the ping flood attack in
which many ICMP echo request packets are sent to the target. The SNMP ICMP MIB
group has a variable icmpInEchos, which shows the sudden increase in its count during
the ping flood attack. During the UDP flood attack, SNMP UDP MIB group's
udpInDatagrams shows a similar increase in its count. To detect localized variations in
important MIB variables, a time series is segmented in small sub-time series which are
compared to the normal profiles. In a DDoS attack, variations are so intense that
averaging the time series on properly chosen time intervals enables anomaly detection.
The above are network based intrusion detection systems, but intrusion detection
can also be performed at a host. A data mining based approach is one such method [25].
Datasets consisting of normal and abnormal data points are gathered and fed to a
classification algorithm to obtain classifiers. These classifiers once trained on the training
datasets are then used to find abnormal data points. D-WARD [26] is an intrusion
detection system to be installed at the network edges to detect attack sources. It monitors
network traffic rates to determine asymmetry in the traffic rate. Typically in a DDoS
attack like the SYN attack, there are more SYN packets leaving the network as compared
to ACK packets entering the network. D-WARD emphasized on stopping the attacks
close to the sources so that network congestion is reduced. Attack traffic in general even
affects traffic not intended to the victim, and thus D-WARD also minimizes the collateral
damage from the attack.

12

Figure 1.5 Conceptual diagram of the PPM scheme where each router marks packets
probabilistically so that victim can reconstruct the entire path from the source router.

Intrusion response systems are required to find the source of the attack to stop the attack.
Blocking the attack traffic is sometimes done manually by contacting network
administrators who change the filtering policies to drop the attack traffic at routers. If an
attacker is using source IP address spoofing, manual filtering is not useful and schemes
like IP traceback are required. IP traceback traces the IP packets back to their sources and
helps reveal attack sources [27][28]. In probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [29], routers
mark their addresses on packets that traverse through them. Packets are selected
randomly with some fixed probability of marking. A victim upon receiving many packets
can construct the route back to the sources by reading router marks. Router vendors need
to enable the marking scheme, and so ISP participation is required. This scheme does not
require additional bandwidth overhead, which is an important advantage of this scheme.
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Figure 1.6 Conceptual diagram of the DPM scheme where only edge routers mark all
packets so that the victim can determine the edge router from which the attack is initiated.
In a contrast, a scheme referred to as deterministic packet marking (DPM) [30], only
marks packets passing through edge routers of the network. At the victim, a table is
maintained for mapping between source addresses and router interface addresses. This
facilitates the reconstruction and identification of source of the packets.
ICMP traceback, referred to as iTrace [31], requires a router sending an ICMP
traceback message for I in every 20000 packets to a destination address which is the
same as the destination address of the selected packet. The traceback message consists of
the timestamp, the next hop, the previous hop, and the packet payload information to
which the ICMP traceback message is sent. The TTL field of the packet payload field is
set to 255. During the attack, the victim can construct routes that the packets are
traversing based on the ICMP messages it has received. This method requires separate
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ICMP messages to be sent during the attack, and thus extra bandwidth is needed. If the
DDoS attack is severe, the iTrace packets may be dropped. To prevent dropping of iTrace
packets, routers should implement complex scheduling mechanisms that give higher
priority to iTrace packets.
IP traceback schemes which do not use marking techniques are discussed next.
Centertrack is a completely different IP traceback method in which all the edge routers
route traffic via an overlay network to central tracking routers during the attack [32]. The
source of the attack traffic is logically one hop away from the central routers by virtua of
the overlay network. ISP involvement is high in this method as ISP has to implement the
overlay system to divert traffic to central tracking routers and block malicious traffic.
Hash based IP traceback, referred to as source path isolation engine (SPIE), saves partial
packet information of packets passing through a router [33]. It uses several hash functions
and bloom filters to optimize storage of packet information. As the bloom filter becomes
70% full, it is archived and another one is used. The routers participating in this scheme
are called data generation agents, and the network is divided into several regions. In
every region, the SPIE collection and reduction agents connect to all data generation
agents to query for packet information during the attack. Querying collection and
reduction agents reveals the source of the attack packets. Controlled flooding is another

IP traceback technique; it is feasible only during a DoS attack. It relies on the fact that
during the attack network links should be congested, and so flooding these links with
more traffic would increase the packet drop rates on that link. The process of flooding is
repeated to next hop links until the source of the attack is reached. This proposal requires
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the ability to flood a link when a host itself is under attack and it also contributes to the
attack traffic making it a rather controversial idea.
Intrusion mitigation systems defend against the on-going attack. Adaptive Queue
Management (AQM) schemes aim to detect and regulate misbehaving flows in the
Internet, i.e., flows which do not follow congestion control, such as UDP flows. AQM
schemes monitor the router buffer to detect misbehaving flows, and mark or drop packets
that belong to these flows. The Adaptive Virtual Queue (AVQ) scheme [34] is described
since AVQ is a relatively novel scheme that outperforms most of the other AQM
schemes. AVQ works as follows: a router with capacity C maintains a virtual queue with
capacity C* C and queue size equal to the actual queue size. Upon arrival of a real
packet, a fake packet is added to the virtual queue if there is a space in the queue. If the
fake packet is dropped from the queue, then a real packet is either dropped or marked to
notify the sender of the congestion. The virtual queue capacity is updated on each packet
arrival according to the following equation:

where A' denotes the packet arrival rate at the link, 7 is the desired link utilization, and
a is the smoothing parameter. Thus, in brief, the idea of AVQ is to mark or drop as a

function of the link utilization: if the utilization is high, the marking probability is high.
The pushback scheme [35] has also been proposed to mitigate the impact of DDoS
attacks, but its approach is different from an AQM scheme. Pushback, also known as
aggregate congestion control scheme (ACC), drops DDoS attack traffic by detecting the
attack and sends signals to drop the attack traffic closer to the source. The rationale
behind the pushback scheme is that the attack traffic has a unique signature in an attack,
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where the signature consists of identifiers such as port numbers, IP addresses, and IP
prefixes. By detecting a signature in the aggregate attack traffic, upstream routers can be
instructed to rate-limit flows that match the signature. A router in a pushback scheme has
two components: a local ACC mechanism and a pushback mechanism.

Figure 1.7 Conceptual diagram of the pushback scheme where a router drops attack
traffic based on the attack aggregate signature; it also requests upstream routers to
perform attack filtering.

The local ACC mechanism is invoked if the packet loss percentage exceeds a threshold of

10%. It then tries to determine the aggregate congestion signature and correspondingly
tries to rate limit the aggregate traffic. If the rate limiting does not reduce the arrival rate
of the attack traffic below a pre-defined target rate, ACC invokes the pushback
mechanism which sends pushback messages to the upstream routers to filter the attack

17
traffic. By repeating this scheme upstream, pushback aims at rate-limiting the attack
traffic at the source network. Throttling is another approach to defend web servers from a
DDoS attack. It uses max-min fairness algorithm to compute rate to drop excess traffic.
Upstream routers also participate in the scheme so as to drop the attack traffic near the
source. There have been several ways to mitigate specific DDoS attacks like SYN
attacks. A technique, referred to as a SYN cookie, avoids giving server resources to the
SYN packet until a SYN/ACK is received [36].

1.6 Defenses For Low Rate DoS Attacks
Some countermeasures to mitigate the low rate DoS attacks in the Internet have been
reported although none of them has made a comprehensive attempt to address such
attacks with IP address spoofing.
The autocorrelation and dynamic time warping algorithm [37] relies on the
periodic property of the attack traffic to detect the low rate DoS attacks. It proposes a
deficit round robin algorithm to filter the attack flows; however it fails to drop attack
packets when the attacker uses the continuous cycle and randomized IP address spoofing
as each attack flow is a combination of multiple flows and each will be treated as a new
flow. Thus, the attacker can easily evade the filtering mechanism. The randomization of
RTO [38] proposed to mitigate the low rate TCP DoS attack cannot defend against the
RoQ attack, which targets the network element rather than the end host. The main idea
reported in [38] is to randomize the minimum RTO instead of setting it to be one second
should be randomized. However, it ignores the advantages of having the minimum RTO
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of one second, which was chosen as a balance between an aggressive value and a
conservative value.
The Collaborative Detection and Filtering scheme proposed in [39] involves
cooperation among routers to throttle and push the attack traffic towards the source. They
rely on the autocorrelation property to distinguish the periodic behavior of the attack
traffic from the legitimate traffic. Thus, it needs extra DSP hardware for implementation,
and extra memory to store the flow information of the attack packets to be dropped. The
scheme maintains a malicious flow table and a suspicious flow table, which can be
overwhelmed under the presence of the IP address spoofing. The novel part is the
cumulative traffic spectrum that can distinguish traffic with and without the attack. In the
traffic spectrum with the attack, the energy is found more localized in lower frequencies.
The attacker can randomize the attack parameters in the RoQ attack. This work does not
provide clear guidelines to activate attack packets filtering.
The wavelet based approach identifies the abnormal change in the incoming
traffic rate and the outgoing acknowledgments to detect the presence of low rate TCP
DoS attacks [13]. This approach cannot identify the RoQ attack. The wavelet approach
does not filter the attack traffic. The buffer sizing method [40] proposes to regulate the
buffer size so that the attack flows can be detected as high rate flows by the RED-PD
filter, and subsequently dropped. This work does not consider the RoQ attack in their
analysis; it is difficult for this approach to detect the RoQ attack because the average rate
of an RoQ attack is very low. The buffer sizing scheme fails if an attacker uses IP address
spoofing as the high rate attack flow is a combination of multiple low rate individual
flows. A modified AQM scheme referred to as HAWK [41] works by identifying bursty
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flows on short timescales, but lacks good filtering mechanisms to block the attack flows
that can use the IP address spoofing. This approach can penalize the legitimate short
bursty flows, thereby reducing their throughput. A filtering scheme similar to HAWK is
proposed to estimate the bursty flows on shorter and longer time scales [42]. The main
idea is to use per-TCP flow rate as the normal rate, and anything above that rate is
considered abnormal. The identification of flow rates is done online. On a shorter time
scale, it is very easy to penalize a normal flow as a bursty flow. The proposal did not
consider the random IP address spoofing, where every packet may have a new flow id.
They used a very complex filtering technique. With the use of the IP address spoofing, it
is difficult to come up with the notion of a flow as the number of packets per flow can be
randomized in any fashion during every ON period.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers the
discussion of the effects of low rate DoS attacks on VoIP traffic. Chapter 3 presents a
simple time difference technique to detect the low rate DoS attacks. Chapter 4 describes
the proposed mitigation technique against the RoQ attacks, which use IP address
spoofing. Chapter 5 presents the proposed quiet attack, which uses several novel
techniques to maintain stealthiness, and Chapter 6 discusses a variant of the quiet attack,
referred to as the perfect attack. Concluding remarks along with a discussion on future
works are finally given in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2
LOW RATE DOS ATTACKS AND VOIP TRAFFIC

2.1 Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) technology has emerged as one of the killer application on the
Internet, as web traffic did in early 90's. VoIP is a QoS sensitive application, and the best
effort service model of the Internet is not designed to carry such traffic.
To address the challenges of sending voice over the Internet, a few intelligent
protocols have been devised for carrying these data. At the transport layer, UDP, which is
a connectionless protocol, has been the choice to transport voice. UDP serves better than
TCP for voice, as TCP's "acknowledge/rate adjustment" concept is applicable to the
reliable and network-aware data delivery model, but is unfit for voice traffic, which needs
data at the "right-time". VoIP applications use RTP-UDP protocols at the transport layer,
where RTP [43] is a real time transport protocol that provides some basic transport layer
functions. RTP uses RTCP [43] conjunctionally to provide feedback about statistics of
the received data back to the sender. Four major protocols ITU-T H.323, IETF SIP,
MGCP, and MEGACO/H.248 [44] have been proposed for call setup. Naturally, one
should be concerned about security as voice packets are sent over a network, like the
Internet, which is not controlled by any single entity. Several challenges for VoIP
security are highlighted in [45]. VoIP imposes some tight budget requirements like delay
to be less than 150msec and the packet loss to be less than 1%. DoS attacks have been
rampaging the Internet and they are bound to cause an impact on VoIP traffic too. It is
also obvious that high rate UDP will affect VoIP traffic, but the literature lacks a
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systematic study of the effects of the low rate DoS attacks on VoIP traffic, as they are
typically known to cause damage to TCP traffic. In addition, the low rate UDP attack
does not continuously send UDP traffic, and so it is interesting to study the behavior of
such periodic high rate UDP flows on legitimate UDP VoIP flows. This Chapter thus
investigates the effects of the new low rate DoS attacks on this delay sensitive VoIP
traffic, as the Internet traffic is a mix of UDP and TCP traffic [46], [47]. Forward error
correction (FEC), which is used to recover the lost VoIP packets, is also considered in the
analysis presented in this Chapter. This Chapter studies the performance of VoIP calls by
using ITU-T Emodel rather than providing abstract numbers of packet loss, and provides
comprehensive analysis.

2.2 Problem Description
In this Section, evaluation methodology to assess the impact of low rate DoS attacks on
VoIP traffic is presented. A low rate DoS attack model is considered in this study. Figure
1.4 shows the variation of the periodicity of the low rate attack models. To make an easy
distinction between the two attacks, an attack with time period less than or equal to one
second is classified as a low rate DoS attack while an attack with a time period greater
than one second is classified as an RoQ attack. The RoQ attack is an attack whose
objective is to reduce the quality of service received by an application. It may not cause
denial of service, which is not its goal, but will lead to reduction in quality of service. It is
important to note that the reduction of quality will be different for different applications.
For VoIP, standard models are used to determine quality rating and depict reduction of
quality. As mentioned before, Internet traffic is constituted by traffic generated by a
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variety of applications running on top of TCP or UDP [46], [47]. Any attack on the
Internet will have some impact on both the UDP and the TCP traffic. Since UDP does not
have any congestion control or accountability mechanism, it pumps data at the set rate.
VoIP traffic performance is characterized by three parameters: the delay, the jitter, and
the packet loss. All of these parameters are closely tied to the time varying network state.
We have decided to evaluate the impacts of the periodic attacks on VoIP traffic for the
following reasons.
Low average rate attacks rely on sending high rate, bursts of packets with small
duration to fill up the targeted router queue, and thereby deny access to the competing
flows. These sudden transients are bound to cause abrupt changes in the jitter/packet
loss/delay of VoIP traffic. The length of the burst can be tuned to maximize its impact on
the jitter/packet loss/delay. The period of the attack can be kept further high to attain a
low average rate. We conjecture that the low rate attack UDP traffic will affect the low
rate UDP (VoIP) traffic owing to the fundamental property of UDP of being nonadaptive.
In this Chapter, the goal is to characterize these changes due to a low rate DoS
and RoQ attack, and decide if these attacks possess sufficient potential to force a VoIP
call, which is in different ranges [48], [49] of quality, into unsatisfactory regions of
operation. Tremendous research efforts have focused on minimizing the end-to-end
delay, the packet loss, and the packetization delay [43] of a VoIP flow, and so it is
important to analyze effects of these transients due to the attack. On the links where calls
are experiencing poor quality, due to the network conditions, these attacks can be
detrimental [50]. The VoIP delay can consist of different components; this study focuses
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only on the propagation, transmission and queuing delay in the network, and the
deviation of this segment of the delay due to the attack. Two commonly used models are
used to analyze VoIP packet loss to understand the behavior of packet loss due to the
attack.
Random Loss Model: In this model, a packet is lost according to the simple
probability p , which is referred to as the average loss probability in this study. If X is a
boolean random variable where 1 means packet lost and 0 means no loss, then

p = E[X .
Gilbert Bursty Loss Model: Many studies about the packet loss nature have found
that the Internet packet loss is bursty [51], [52]. This proposed model is widely used to
describe bursty losses. The Gilbert loss model is characterized by two probabilities called
conditional loss probability Pc = P[X n+1 =11 X an=nduc1oit]ls
probability /3,, = E[X n ] . The conditional loss probability quantifies the burstiness of the
packet loss. A state model representation with the transition probabilities p and q is
shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The Gilbert bursty loss model.
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2.3 Error Correction and E-model
To mitigate packet loss in the Internet, Forward Error Correction (FEC) [53] is used. A
media independent FEC recovers lost packets in a bit-exact form, and the commonly used
code is called Reed-Solomon, RS(n,k), where n and k are the number of all and nonFEC data units, respectively. The basic idea to recover the lost packets is to receive at
least k packets from a block of n packets. The RS(n, k) code works by piggybacking the
forward packet information in the piggybacked packet, and so even if one packet is lost,
its contents can be obtained from the following piggybacked packet. There is another
media dependent FEC known as Low Bit Redundancy (LBR) , which works by encoding
a lower bit rate version of the same audio in subsequent packets. So, even if the higher bit
rate audio packets are lost, the lower bit rate audio packets can be used to reconstruct the
voice. It was shown in [54] that RS(n, k) FEC performs better than LBR, and
so RS(3, 2) FEC was used in this analysis. Two VoIP codecs commonly used in the
Internet were chosen, with following specifications: G711 RS(3, 2) FEC with a media bit
rate of 96Kbps and G729a RS(3, 2) FEC with a media bit rate of 12Kbps. For RS(n,k),
the probability to recover packets given the average loss probability p is [55]:
(2.1)

In this work, n= 3 and k = 2 . It is well-known that performance of VoIP decreases
significantly at the same average loss rate when the loss is bursty [54]. We consider two
other metrics apart from the conditional loss probability of the Gilbert model to analyze
the loss burstiness, as suggested by the IP performance metrics (IPPM) working group:
consecutive packet loss run length and interloss distance (ILD) [56]. A consecutive loss
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run length is defined as the length of consecutive packet losses. The ILD determines the
distance between two consecutive loss run lengths. Consider a binary sequence
0110001111000 of 1 s and Os, where 1 indicates packet lost, and 0 indicates packet
received. The consecutive loss runs in this example are two and four. In addition, ILD is
three in the same example. The ILD metric is important because small ILD values affect
the final voice quality. Small ILD values also have a considerable negative impact on the
FEC performance [56], which is comprehensible, considering the characteristics of FEC,
which needs at least k packets in a group of n packets to recover lost packets. A small
ILD value means more consecutive losses spaced close to each other.
Mean Opinion Score (MOS) and R-factor are used to evaluate the quality of
voice. MOS is known as the arithmetic average of opinion; the R-factor is computed from
formulas supplied by the E-model. MOS is related to the R-factor by following formula:

Cole and Rosenbluth [57] provided a simplified formula to estimate the R-factor:

where Id and Ie are delay and loss impairment. The delay and loss impairment can be
easily obtained from the graphs provided in [57] by curve fitting. A similar approach to
evaluate MOS and R-factor is found in several studies [54]. The two previously described
codec's are chosen because there are established results that map the loss probability to
the corresponding MOS as shown in Figure 2.2 where T is the packet size such as
10ms/packet for G711. The R-factor and MOS calculation procedures are described in
later sections when results are evaluated. R-factor in the range of 90 to 100 is considered
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best while that between 60 and 50 is considered poor or the result of a DoS. Thus,
anything between 90 and 60 is considered the result of a RoQ.

Figure 2.2 MOS behaviors from the E-model.

2.4 Simulation Results
The network model used to test effects of the low rate DoS and RoQ attacks on VoIP
traffic is described in the beginning. This section describes the experimental setup by
using ns2 for this study. To conduct any network study based on simulations, it is
important to have correct simulation settings [58] or else the results will not be insightful.
The network model uses a typical dumbbell topology as shown in Figure 2.3. The
network topology in Figure 2.4 shows that the traffic passes through a bottleneck link of
10Mbps from the access links of 100Mbps. All the access links have random delays
uniformly distributed in the 50-100ms range [58]. The access links connecting the sink
agents to the bottleneck link has a link delay of 10ms. The bottleneck link uses a simple
droptail queuing policy with a queue length of 500 packets.
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Figure 2.3 The network topology.

The queue size is kept twice the bandwidth delay product (BDP) as it was
suggested in [59] to keep the queue size between 1.25 BDP and 2 BDP for reasonable
response times for droptail queues. The droptail policy is used because it is widely used
in most of the routers. By using a droptail policy, packets will only be dropped when the
queue is full. The network traffic is composed of five FTP flows, many HTTP flows, five
VoIP flows, and a single attack flow. The FTP flows use the TCP selective
acknowledgment algorithm, which is widely deployed in the Internet. Important ns2 fullTCP parameters adopted are a maximum segment size of 1460 bytes, window size of 50
packets, minimum RTO of 1 sec, and the rest of the parameters are defaults set by ns-2.
We have used the packmime HTTP traffic generator [60] in the network model. There are
two packmime client and server instances in the diagram. The packmime traffic generator
data is based on the real world traces of the Internet traffic. The packmime client and
server agents initiate HTTP connections by using the user-specified average rate
parameter. We keep the average rate as ten connections per second. The delaybox is used
to provide per flow dropping probability, round trip times, and bottleneck link speeds.
The per flow dropping probability is kept zero and the server bandwidth is uniformly
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distributed from 1 to 20 Mbps. The test-packmime-delaybox.tcl script [61] was modified
for simulations presented in this Chapter.

Figure 2.4 Simulation topology.

The VoIP traffic is modeled by using G711 and G729a codecs with RS (3,2) FEC.
The rate of a G711 flow is 96Kbps with packet size equal to 10ms and that of a G729a is
12Kbps with packet size equal to 20ms. The simulation runs for 600 seconds with VoIP
flows being active for 180 seconds. The attack traffic is introduced 10 seconds later in the
same network that passes through the bottleneck link. Figure 2.5 shows different attack
scenarios that are considered, where T is the time period, t the burst period, and R the
burst rate of the attack. The first two attack scenarios are shrew attacks with the attack
rates equal to and double that of the bottleneck capacity in the first and second case,
respectively. The next four are RoQ attack scenarios with various attack rates and attack
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burst lengths. An initial simulation is done without attack and referred to as the baseline
scenario. In the baseline scenario, packet loss is zero for all VoIP flows.
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Figure 2.5 The attack scenarios.
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Figure 2.6 The packet loss for the G711 codec.
The one-way delays for VoIP calls in simulations and corresponding delay
impairment values are obtained by curve fitting as 103, 98, 80, 77, and 99 msec, and 2.5,
2.4, 2.2, 2.2, and 2.4, respectively [57]. The delay impairment values are such that their
impact on the R-factor is minuscule, and so effects of the attack on the loss impairment
factor can be scrutinized, as low rate DoS and RoQ attacks increase the packet loss.
These results will provide the lower bound on the effects of low rate DoS and RoQ
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attacks on the VoIP quality, and if the delay is high, these attacks will cause a higher
degree of impact. The loss impairment can be obtained from the standard loss mapping
between the average loss probability and MOS for G.711 and G.729 codecs provided by
ITU-T's E-model by curve fitting, a technique used in several studies [57].

Figure 2.7 The packet loss for the G729a codec.

Figure 2.8 The average MOS for each scenario using G729a codec VoIP flows.

Figure 2.9 The average MOS for each scenario using G711 codec VoIP flows.
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Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show packet loss results for the G711 codec and the G729a codec,
respectively. The average packet loss is almost similar for both codecs in each case, but is
high when the rate is double that of the bottleneck capacity. The most damaging attack
scenarios are 2, 5, and 6. The last two attack scenarios demonstrate that RoQ attacks can
be equally lethal as compared to the shrew attack when they have longer burst lengths.
These RoQ attacks with longer burst lengths compromise attack potency by sending more
attack traffic. Attack potency is a metric defined for RoQ attacks; it represents a tradeoff
between the attack detectability and the attack effects on the legitimate traffic. With
higher attack traffic, the attack effect on the legitimate traffic increases, but the attack
potency decreases as the attack can be more easily detected and mitigated. The RoQ
attack and shrew attack can always use botnets or IP address spoofing thereby
distributing the attack traffic during each burst among different IP addresses. We now
substitute the average loss probability (p) obtained from the simulations in (1) to
calculate the probability of loss with FEC incorporated (PFEC). That is, PFEC takes into
account of error correction. This improved loss probability due to FEC is then used to
compute the loss impairment factor Ie . Finally, MOS can be obtained from Figure 2.2
which gives standard mapping for G711 and G729a codecs. We have plotted the average
values of the MOS for scenarios 2, 5, and 6 using the G729a and G711 codecs in Figures
2.8 and 2.9, respectively. The different VoIP quality ratings as per E-model are shown in
Figure 2.10. Scenarios 1, 3, and 4 are not shown in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 because the
corresponding packet loss is not very high, and FEC can recover the losses thereby the
voice quality can be classified as high or best. The voice quality is medium for all tested
scenarios according to Figure 2.8 for G729a VoIP flows, indicating reduction of quality.
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The voice quality is also medium for scenarios 2 and 6 of G711 VoIP flows. In other
words, the voice quality is at an acceptable service level, and it can be concluded that the
low rate DoS and RoQ attacks do cause a reduction of quality according to the E-model
quality rating scale. In Section 2.3, it was decided that voice ratings of high, medium, and
low correspond to reduction of quality. If FEC was not used, then the attack would have
caused denial-of-service, i.e., voice rating of poor or below.

Figure 2.10 The E-model VoIP quality ratings.

Figure 2.11 Packet loss run length for G711 codec for scenario 2.

Figure 2.12 ILD for G711 codec for scenario 2.
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Figure 2.13 ILD for G729a codec for scenario 2.

Figure 2.14 Packet loss run length for G729a codec for scenario 2.

Figure 2.15 Packet loss run length for G711 codec for scenario 6.

We next investigate the effect of low rate DoS attacks on the burstiness of the
VoIP packet loss by evaluating the conditional loss probability of the Gilbert loss model,
consecutive packet loss run lengths, and ILD for scenario 6 as it has high burst length and
burst rate, and for scenario 2 as it has short time period of 1 sec and high burst rate. The
average conditional loss probabilities of each VoIP flow in scenarios 2 and 6 is 9.8% and
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12.88%, respectively, for the G729 codec case. They are 7.3% and 9.1% for scenarios 2
and 6, respectively, for the G711 codec case. The conditional loss probability is much
higher in scenario 6, thus implying that the burst length does play a major role; so a RoQ
attack with higher burst lengths will increase the bursty losses of the VoIP flows. This
observation is consistent with characteristics of the UDP protocol, which is not network
adaptive, and thus high rate UDP bursts with long burst lengths will force packet drops
spaced closed to each other. It is always possible to make burst length much longer than
1.2 sec but the objective of the RoQ attack is not to cause denial of service, though in
reality, an attacker can do so. The effect of conditional loss probabilities on the final loss
probabilities with FEC has been studied. For smaller conditional loss probabilities, the
Gilbert model and random loss model are concluded to be similar [54]. The conditional
loss probabilities were found to be much less than 30% as reported in [54]. So, further
analysis using conditional loss probability is not necessary, but ILD and packet loss run
lengths results are still presented which confirm that the burstiness of the VoIP packet
loss will increase if an attacker chooses to use higher burst length.
ILD and packet loss run lengths are other indicators of burstiness, which are
shown in Figures 2.11-2.18. Packet loss run lengths higher than 5 were not rare, and that
of higher frequency of ILD less than 3 were not rare either. Both of these factors can
severely affect VoIP quality of service [54]. The percentage of ILD fewer than three is
high as compared to some experiments reported in [54]. This indicates that the losses are
high enough to drop voice frames even with the use of FEC, thereby leading to dropped
calls if a user becomes unsatisfied. The ILD and consecutive packet loss run lengths
primarily depend on the attack burst length and the attack rate. We can see from scenario
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2 in Figures 2.11-2.15 that the frequency of ILD less than 3 and packet loss run lengths
greater than 5 is low, but it is high for scenario 6 as shown in Figures 2.16-2.19 for both
G729a and G711 codec cases.

Figure 2.16 ILD for G711 codec for scenario 6.

Figure 2.17 Packet loss run length for G729a codec for scenario 6.

Figure 2.18 ILD for G729a codec for scenario 6.
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Figure 2.19 The deterlab topology snapshot.
Below are some critical observations about the packet loss from demonstrated
results:
•

The RoQ attacks with shorter burst lengths and burst rates fail to cause any
damage in presence of FEC.

•

The RoQ attacks with higher burst lengths and burst rates can lead to small ILD
and high packet loss run lengths, thus leading to dropped calls, which can lead to
denial of service.

•

Low rate DoS attacks reduce VoIP quality in presence of FEC.

•

The attack effect on the G729a codec is more severe as compared to G711 as it
reduces the voice quality rating from Best to Low.

•

Packet loss recovery schemes like FEC are required to recover from both low rate
DoS and RoQ attacks.
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It could have been possible to increase the attack parameters, particularly, burst
length, but it would lead to exposure of the attacker, but effects of the low rate DoS and
RoQ attack in the stealthy form were of more interest. Thus, demonstrated results will act
as a lower bound on the effects of the low rate DoS and RoQ attacks on the VoIP traffic.
Nevertheless, with representative attack scenario 6, it is demonstrated that these attacks
can be more lethal by increasing the burst length.

2.5 Deterlab Experiments
The deterlab [62] is a testbed designed for network security research and is a
collaborative effort of many universities. The important objective of the testbed is to
allow experiments related to Internet attacks that are difficult to conduct in a normal
testbed or over the Internet. This will help in developing robust systems and studying
vulnerabilities of current protocols. We decided to evaluate the effects of the low rate
DoS and RoQ attacks on the VoIP traffic by using the deterlab. Figure 2.19 shows the
snapshot of a deterlab topology used for this experiment.
Each system is running a Red Hat Linux 9 OS. Conceptually, the deterlab
topology is the same as that shown in Figure 2.3, which has a bottleneck link between
two routers. Here, all links are 100Mbps with bottleneck link set to 10Mbps between
Arouter and Crouter in Figure 2.19, and various delays obtained from a uniform
distribution of 80-150ms along the access links. The Arouter and Crouter are running
kernel level click modular router [63] with a drop tail queue size of 600 packets. The
queue size is kept as twice the bandwidth delay product. All the routers use dual Pentium
4 Xeon processors with 2GB memory. The long-lived TCP flow is setup by using the
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ettcp program, and VoIP traffic is setup by using the D-ITG traffic generator [64] as a
G729a codec VoIP flow. We have two VoIP and three long-lived TCP flows in the
network. We also use the harpoon [65] traffic generator to create background network
traffic similar to the real Internet traces. One node acts as a harpoon client sending on
average 3 Mbps traffic throughout the experiment. We thus have 3 FTP and 2 VoIP
flows sharing the remaining 7Mbps of the bottleneck link capacity in absence of the
attack. The packet loss of VoIP traffic in absence of the attack is zero. We then introduce
attack traffic based on six scenarios described earlier in Figure 2.5. Figure 2.20 shows
the packet loss results, which indicate that the packet loss is slightly higher as compared
to ns-2 simulation results for similar scenarios shown in Figure 2.7. The most damaging
scenarios are 1, 2, 5, and 6. However, in the simulation results, the packet loss increased
when the rate of the attack was doubled as shown in Figure 2.7, but increase in the rate
had no prominent effect for testbed results. We conjecture that a high enough rate equal
to that of the bottleneck was good enough to instigate a significant impact such that
increasing the attack rate did not cause further damage. The corresponding average MOS
value for each scenario is shown in Figure 2.21; it is obtained by performing similar
analysis discussed in the previous section on simulation results. In scenarios 1 and 2, the
MOS value is in the poor range, indicating a denial of service. In scenarios 5 and 6, the
MOS value is in the low range, which indicates reduction of quality. These observations
are consistent with the simulation results that the loss from some RoQ attacks can be
recovered by using FEC, while some RoQ attacks with high burst rate and burst length
can lead to reduction of quality. On the other hand, low rate DoS attacks can lead to poor
VoIP quality according to the E-model quality rating scale. FEC is required to recover
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from losses; otherwise, VoIP users will be denied service because of the low rate DoS
and RoQ attacks. Although high end PCs were used as routers in the deterlab tests, it can
be assumed that the packet loss for VoIP flows might be little less on commercial routers
with dedicated hardware and software used for efficient routing. Finally, it can be at least
concluded that VoIP is indeed affected by low rate DoS and RoQ attacks as reconfirmed
by results from the Deterlab testbed.

Figure 2.20 The packet loss on Deterlab for G729a codec VoIP flows.

Figure 2.21 The average MOS for each scenario using G729a codec VoIP flows.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrates that the low rate DoS and RoQ attacks not only pose a threat to
the TCP traffic, but are also detrimental to the QoS sensitive UDP based applications like
VoIP. The loss of packets is the main concern from these types of attacks. This study
shows that these attacks pose serious threat to the Internet traffic and presses for
immediate attention to deploy effective mitigation strategies against these attacks in the
Internet.

CHAPTER 3
A SIMPLE DETECTION SCHEME

3.1 Approach and Methodology
A network scenario in Figure 3.1 is shown to explain where the proposed detection
system is deployed. It shows edge routers connecting a local area network to the Internet
with typical client server connections. Each edge router acts as an entry and exit point for
traffic originating from that local area network; essentially all incoming and outgoing
traffic will pass through this point. The proposed detection system can be deployed at the
edge routers of a local area network in which the server is present. For illustrative
purposes, it is assumed that all clients are outside the local area network in which the
server is present, so that the detection system can monitor all flows connecting to the
server.

Figure 3.1 Proposed detection system deployed at an edge router.

Figure 3.2 shows the basic layout of the system. It has three basic blocks, namely,
flow classifier, object module, and filter. Each block functions as follows:
• The flow classifier module classifies packets based on the flow ID by means of a
combination of the IP source address, IP source port, IP destination address, and
IP destination port. Flow information is obtained from these packets, and packets
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are forwarded as usual by the routing mechanism resulting in no additional delay
apart from the lookup delay. The object module consists of various objects for
each flow that is monitored. Detailed explanation is given in the next sub-section.
A flow is monitored until it is considered normal.
• The filter is used to block flows that are identified as malicious by the object
module.

Figure 3.2 The detection system architecture.

Consider a DoS attack which tries to exploit protocol shortcomings. The object
module maintains per flow information by creating objects per flow called flow objects.
A thin data structure layer is designed to keep track of these flow objects. It maintains
only those parameters which are exploited in the attack. This thin structure keeps separate
track of information about flows classified as malicious. This information is then relayed
to the filter module.
The flow objects maintain the arrival times of packets at the edge router in the
pseudo transport layer. The malicious flow detection sub-module of the object module
computes the time difference of consecutive packets of each flow. The sub-module
computes the average high and average low of the time difference values. The average
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high value of the time difference repeats periodically for the attack flow; other flows do
not exhibit this property. The malicious flow detection sub-module then estimates the
burst length of a flow based on the packet arrival times. A flow exhibiting periodicity in
the time difference graph is marked malicious as no legitimate flows will show such
periodicity.

3.2 Results
NS2 is used to demonstrate the performance of the proposed detection scheme. The
experimental topology is shown in Figure 3.3. As specified earlier, the time difference is
computed for consecutive packets. Figures 3.4-3.6 show plots of this time difference for
three different types of flows. Note that the attack traffic shows periodicity in the time
difference while HTTP and FTP traffic lacks periodicity. This is the most important step
in distinguishing the attack flow from other flows.

3.3 Major Drawbacks
The time difference technique uses a per-flow approach to store the arrival times of the
packets belonging to each flow, and computes the inter-arrival times between the
consecutive packets to detect periodicity. The attacker using IP address spoofing can
easily deceive this simple per-flow approach as the time difference approach will not be
able to detect periodicity in the attack flow, which is no longer a single flow.
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Figure 3.3 The simulation topology.

Figure 3.4 The time difference of the attack flow.
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Figure 3.5 The time difference of the HTTP flow.

Figure 3.6 The time difference of the FTP flow.
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3.4 Summary

This chapter describes the proposed time difference technique against the low rate TCP
DoS attacks. The scheme is effective in detecting the low rate TCP DoS attack at the
edge routers. The focus here is to present the framework of the proposed detection
concept.

CHAPTER 4
AN IMPROVED DETECTION SCHEME

4.1 Problem Description
The MIT Spoofer project has reemphasized the detrimental effect of the IP address
spoofing. The subnet IP address spoofing [66] is easily orchestrated, as the ingress IP
address filtering cannot contain IP spoofing;
To illustrate the subnet IP address spoofing, consider an attacker in the subnet,
12.28.34.0 to 12.28.34.100; an attacker can easily use any address in this range for
spoofing a source IP address inside this subnet. The IP address of every outgoing packet
can be easily spoofed by randomly selecting an IP address from the pool of IP addresses
available for spoofing; this is referred to as random IP address spoofing. It is assumed
that the attacker has complete control of the source machine and can change the operating
system stack as needed. The attacker can use either the UDP or the TCP protocol to send
a packet with any possible value in the packet header. Let k be the number of packets in
each flow. The flow-id of a flow is defined by the combination of a source IP address, a
destination IP address, a source port, and a destination port. This definition will be
adopted throughout this Chapter. The open knowledge of the RoQ attack and the ONOFF periodic blasting attack [18] shows that periodicity can be random for the low rate
DoS and RoQ attack. As described in [18], the attacker will have one IP address for every
ON period; this is referred to as continuous cycle IP address spoofing. A variant of
continuous IP address spoofing would be using a group of IP addresses in each ON
period of the attack. The number of packets in the low rate DoS attack traffic using
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continuous or random IP address spoofing would be similar to the number of packets in a
typical HTTP flow or a short-lived flow. The HTTP flows are hence referred to as mice
as compared to long-lived flows known as elephants. Considering the widespread use of
botnets by attackers, it is not difficult for an attacker to use the compromised machines
with valid IP addresses to launch a low rate DoS attack. In addition, the master who
controls botnets can sabotage machines in subnets scattered across the Internet, so that
the attack traffic rate coming out of each subnet is not anomalous, but the aggregated
traffic will lead to DoS when it reaches the targeted router. Use of botnets will also allow
an attacker to use compromised machines to send attack traffic with random and
continuous cycle IP address spoofing. In a low rate DoS attack, the required number of
compromised machines can be low [67]. To make an easy distinction between the two
attacks, an attack with time period less than or equal to one second is classified as a low
rate DoS attack while an attack with a time period greater than one second is classified as
a RoQ attack. The primary scope of this Chapter is to mitigate RoQ attacks with IP
address spoofing in which an attacker can employ different types of IP address spoofing
strategies while launching the RoQ attack.

4.2 Detection system
4.2.1 Detection System Architecture and Logic

The RoQ attacks cause fluctuations in the queue size and congestion levels at the router
during the ON period of the attack. They can incur an increase in the instantaneous
packet loss. The packet losses observed in experiments shown in Chapter 2 were greater
than 2%. It is important that the detection system should be "off' when there is no attack.
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Note that for the RoQ attack, the packet loss might not increase, and so the network
administrator can also invoke the detection system by using the congestion signal from
the active queue management (AQM) system. The proposed defense system in this
Chapter uses congestion signal from the adaptive virtual queue (AVQ) algorithm to
invoke the detection system. Thus, overhead of performing memory intensive analysis
under no attack is eliminated. A network administrator can tune this parameter.
The detection system architecture and the attack detection procedure are depicted
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. The detection system relies on readily available perflow information in today's routers, for example, Cisco Netflow, as shown in Figure 4.1
[68]. The proposed detection system leverages on this readily available per flow
information, thus requiring no major architectural or system changes in the routers. The
contents of the flow size estimation module are periodically flushed to the persistent
storage memory for accurate attack identification. The following parameters are obtained
for every new flow: the packet count (k), the packet size, the createdtime and the
lastaccesed time; these parameters are the same as those facilitated in Cisco Netflow.
The lastaccesed time field allows us to decide when a flow ends. The packet count keeps
track of the number of packets of a particular flow, while the other parameters are selfexplanatory. The benign flow table is used to separate the long-lived flows passing
through the router. On the arrival of a new packet, if the attack filtering is ON, a query is
made to the benign flow table to check whether a flow entry for that packet is present. If
the entry exists, the packet is treated normally going through conventional steps of header
decoding, route lookup, and forwarding. If the entry does not exist, the packet is passed
to the module that implements the attack filtering algorithm which will be described later.
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The entries in the benign flow table are updated once the processing performed in the
persistent storage memory identifies the new legitimate long-lived flows. The long-lived
flows are ones, which are still active after at least two seconds [69]. The benign flow
table also sets an inactivity timer for each flow similar to the one used by Netflow, that
helps eliminating entries of inactive flows in the benign flow table; a flow is considered
inactive if no packet belonging to that flow has been observed for more than the inactive
timeout constant. This also prevents an attacker from exploiting the benign flow table by
sending normal traffic to be classified as benign and reusing the same flow id after a long
time to send the attack traffic.
Further discussion of some related scenarios will be made in Subsection 4.2.2. To
improve the scalability of the scheme, Internet traffic observations made by various
studies [46] were incorporated. The key observation is that a small percentage of the
flows contribute to the majority of the bytes and packets of the total traffic passing
through a link. This knowledge about the long-lived flows is used to achieve considerable
memory savings as well as to provide better throughput for the legitimate long-lived
flows. The advantage of the benign flow table will become clearer, as the filtering
approach is discussed later. This property of the Internet traffic is also the guiding
principle of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack detection algorithm. As discussed earlier,
the low rate DoS and RoQ attack flows that use IP address spoofing or botnets are similar
to legitimate short lived flows in terms of the number of packets per flow, and the
Internet traffic characteristic indicates that short lived flows occupy less percentage of the
total traffic passing through a link. Thus, the Internet traffic property is violated when the
low rate DoS and RoQ attack is instigated in the Internet. The key idea behind the
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detection approach is to detect violation of this property of the Internet traffic. So far,
Steps 1 to 3 have been described in Figure 4.2 except the functioning of the low rate DoS
attack detection algorithm. Step 4 will be detailed in Subsection 4.2.2 when some special
cases of how an adversary can fool the proposed detection system are considered. The
mechanism of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack detection algorithm is further explained
in details along with the pseudo code shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.1 The detection system architecture.
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1) If the Virtual Queue > AVQ AQM threshold. Start
the detection algorithm.
2) If attack filtering ON, check if the packet belongs to
a flow in the benign flow table.
If yes, send the packet directly to the queue and
continue normal operation.
If no, send the packet to the attack filtering module.
3) Periodically, run the low rate DoS and RoQ attack
detection algorithm on the output of the flow size
estimation module. Start the attack filtering algorithm
if RoQ attack is detected.
4) Periodically, run the low rate DoS and RoQ attack
detection algorithm and time difference algorithm on
the benign flow information, while attack filtering is
ON.

Figure 4.2 The attack detection procedure.

1) For all the expired flows with k packets in each flow
in the persistent storage with C as link capacity
and P as minimum packet size,
IF {0< k < C/P, createdtime > current time — 1sec,
lastaccessedtime < current time),
SUM = SUM + Totbytecnt/flow.
2) If SUM > THRESHOLD {Low Rate DoS or ROQ
Attack Detected)

Figure 4.3 Pseudocode of the attack detection algorithm

Figure 4.4 The basic concept of the attack detection algorithm.
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The basic idea of the detection logic can be explained by using Figure 4.4.
Assuming the entire capacity of the link as a big pipe, it is estimated how much of the
pipe is filled by the flows containing atleast k packets in a second. For the time being, it is
assumed that the ON period of the attack to be less than or equal to one second.

The diagram in Figure 4.4 shows the entire capacity and the amount filled by the flows
that have less than or equal to five packets in them every second. Step 1 of the algorithm
computes the traffic load of a group of expired flows that satisfy the required criterion in
the "if' statement. The expired flows are the ones that will not receive any more packets;
it is simply a closed connection between the respective source and destination. Only the
expired flows are considered in Step 1 of the detection algorithm. To observe a sudden
increase in the traffic load from a group of flows in a short time, flows formed and
expired within a second are considered as seen in Step 1. The createdtime and
lastaccesedtime values of individual monitored flows will allow precise selection of the
flows that were formed and expired within the observation time slice of a second. Step 1
is repeated every one second on all the expired flows stored in the persistent memory.
The totalbytecnt of each flow is the SUM of the size of each packet in that flow that can
be easily derived from the IP header. If the (SUM) in Step 2 of the algorithm exceeds a
threshold in Equation (4.1), then the detection system invokes the attack filtering module.
Thus, an attacker using IP address spoofing or botnets will try to send enough packets,
each belonging to a different flow, that are sufficient to fill up the total capacity during
the ON period of the attack. The proper selection of the threshold value is important to
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detect the low rate DoS attack. Three thresholds are proposed to be used in Step 2 of the
detection algorithm:
1)THRESHOLD + B

(4.2)

2)C / 2 +B .<_THRESHOLD <C + B
3)C/ 4+B _<_THRESHOLD <C 12+ B
C is the capacity of the link, and B is the buffer size of the router in Equation (4.2). A

little modification might be required for lower values of thresholds for particular C and B,
which can be obtained by the technique explained in Subsection 4.2.3. The threshold will
be exceeded more often in a low rate DoS attack due to its low time period, and less often
in a RoQ attack due to its high time period. The period of the attack can also be detected
based on instants when the threshold is exceeded.
Various functions of the detection system to detect an attacker using different IP
address spoofing strategies is discussed further. The attacker may use perfect random IP
address spoofing; that is, a new IP address from the pool of available IP addresses is
assigned to every packet. This implies one packet per flow. To detect an attack using
continuous cycle IP address spoofing, or variations of random IP address spoofing with
more than one packet per flow, the value of the SUM variable is checked by keeping k
as 0 <k<C / P, where k is the number of packets in each flow, C is the capacity of the
link, and P is the packet size which can be assumed to be 64 bytes, the size of the
smallest packet. The SUM variable is evaluated to be greater than any of the three
proposed thresholds in a short period of one second, and whether it repeats periodically.
In the next Subsection, to confirm the proposed heuristics, the range of k is kept as
0 < k < C / P to show that in the absence of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack, the value

of the SUM variable does not exceed the proposed thresholds. The perfect random IP
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address spoofing case can be quickly detected by keeping k less than two, and checking if
the value of the SUM variable is greater than any of the proposed three thresholds. Once
the attack is detected, the proposed filtering mechanism is activated in which the attack
packets are dropped as they start filling up the capacity. Thus, even if the attacker uses a
different IP address in each ON period, the attack packets will be dropped, as
demonstrated in the simulation results. RED-PD [18] cannot detect such an attack.

4.2.2 Intelligent Attacker
The only way an attacker can evade detection is if the attack flows are classified as the
benign flows. This can be staged if an attack flow sends packets for more than 2 seconds,
and then uses the same flowid to launch a low rate DoS or RoQ attack. The proposed
detection system will incorporate an approach reported in [70], which can easily detect
low rate DoS and RoQ attacks that do not use IP address spoofing. The time difference
approach relies on computing the time difference between the consecutive packets of a
flow. It was shown in [70] that only the low rate DoS and RoQ attack flows exhibit
periodicity in the time difference, while other legitimate traffic flows lack this
characteristic periodicity property of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack. The time
difference technique can be easily integrated in the current detection system as it only
requires the following per-flow information, the createdtime, the lastaccessed time, and
each packet arrival time from the per-flow systems shown in Figure 4.1. The per-flow
system will have to be configured to provide each packet arrival time as one of the flow
fields, and just has to record the timestamp when it samples a packet belonging to a
particular flow for this requirement. If a particular flow is found to be an attack flow by
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using the time difference technique, it can be easily blocked by filtering traffic coming
from that IP address.
In another possibility, an attacker will use a group of machines (hots) to send
flows for more than 2 seconds to forge classification as the benign flows, and then use
these flowid's to launch a low rate DoS attack. To detect such an attack, the proposed
detection algorithm shown in Figure 4.2 is applied on the benign flows. It requires adding
the total byte count of each flow in the benign flow table for a short period of every one
second. As in detection of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack described before, the
proposed logic of the "SUM' value exceeding predefined thresholds will still hold as the
attack flows are now part of flows classified as benign. To evade the above change in the
detection system, an attacker can simply use some flows classified as benign flows and
others as short-lived flows to launch a low rate DoS or RoQ attack. In this way, the SUM
value of the detection algorithm shown in Figure 4.2 will not exceed the predefined
thresholds when the detection algorithm is applied only on the benign flows. To detect
this variant of a low rate DoS and RoQ attack, the proposed attack detection algorithm is
applied on both the benign and short-lived flows simultaneously to see if the SUM
variable exceeds the proposed thresholds. Now, the SUM variable should exceed one of
the proposed thresholds. For the latter variations of the attack when the low rate DoS and
RoQ attack detection algorithm is used to detect the attack and not the time difference
technique, the attack filtering technique described in Subsection 4.2.4 is used to filter the
attack traffic. This process of detecting an intelligent attacker can be activated once the
attack-filtering algorithm is active. Attention should also be made in classifying flows as
benign once the attack detection algorithm finds flows in the benign flow table causing
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the low rate DoS or RoQ attack. Typically, long-lived flows should be classified as
benign after having been verified their lack of periodicity by using the time difference
technique described earlier. The proposed approach can thus detect the low rate DoS or
RoQ attack that uses any combination of the number of flows participating in the attack
with any time period, any burst period, and any burst rate.
4.2.3 Trace Evaluation
To confirm that the thresholds proposed in the previous Subsection will work for the
Internet traffic, the proposed strategy is evaluated by analyzing the 0C48 (2.5Gbps)
traces provided by CAIDA [71]. Using the Coralreef [72] software, the expired flow
statistics <Source IP address, destination IP address, dource IP port, destination IP port,
packetcnt, Bytecnt, createdtime, and lastaccessedtime> were obtained; they are similar to
the ones that are proposed to collect for all the flows. The attack detection algorithm was
executed using the flow information obtained by the coralreef software to observe the
characteristics of the SUM variable in the absence of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack.
The traces were recorded during August 2002 and April 2003. Figure 4.5 shows the
SUM variable statistics for a 5-minute April 2003 trace. The 0C48 speed is 2.5Gbps, i.e.,
2.5E09, and so C/2 is 1.25E09, and C/4 is 62.5E07. It can be observed from Figure 4.5
that the SUM variable does not exceed any of the proposed thresholds. An ON period in a
low rate DoS attack is typically less than one second as reported in the literature about
low rate DoS attacks. It can be noted in Figure 4.6 the values of the SUM variable for
every 2 seconds, in which case it was assumed an ON period of 2 seconds. The attack
with ON period greater than 2 seconds can certainly be detected by the proposed

58
approach, but they can be easily detected by RED-PD and many other existing AQM
schemes too.

Figure 4.5 Sum statistics for every second.

Figure 4.6 Sum statistics for every two seconds.
Interestingly, it can be argued that the attack cannot be a low rate DoS or RoQ attack,
when the ON period is so long. The SUM variable in Figure 4.6 does not exceed the
proposed thresholds. Similar observations were found in other traces. The tuning of lower
thresholds below C/2 can be done by studying the SUM statistics in the absence of the
attack during the normal router operation. The profile of flow sizes and the SUM
distributions can be obtained in the absence of the attack scalably by using the per flow
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information from systems like Cisco Netflow in Figure 4.1 to understand the unique
properties of traffic distributions on each link, and to adjust the attack detection
thresholds accordingly. It is highlighted that in a short period of one to two seconds the
SUM variable does not exceed the proposed thresholds in the absence of the low rate DoS
and RoQ attack, as observed in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Thus, only during the low rate DoS
and RoQ attack, the SUM will exceed the proposed thresholds.

4.2.4 Filtering Logic
A filtering scheme to mitigate the RoQ attacks is proposed. The low rate DoS and RoQ
attack detection algorithm in Figure 4.2 provides information on how frequently the
attack bursts are instigated from which one may determine the attack type (i.e., RoQ
attack). To filter the RoQ attack packets, which are using the spoofed IP addresses, a
nondeterministic approach is proposed because it is difficult to know which IP address an
attacker will use in future bursts. Thus, it is futile to store the attack IP addresses seen in
the old bursts. A simple method to address this problem is developed. As mentioned
before, the long-lived flows in the benign flow table are separated, and they are treated
preferentially. On the arrival of packets belonging to these flows, unless the buffer is full,
they are enqueued in the queue and are passed normally. Special attention is needed
while identifying a new benign long-lived flow when the attack-filtering mode is ON by
verifying that the difference between createdtime and lastaccessed time should be atleast
two seconds, and the lastaccessed time should be close to the inspection time to classify
the flow as a non-expired, legitimate, and long-lived flow. The detection algorithm also
considers special attack scenarios discussed in Section 4.2.2 before classifying the flow
as a non-expired, legitimate, and long-lived flow. Packets, which belong to the new flows
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and are not present in the benign flow table, are enqueued in the queue, and the current
queue length is then computed. The current queue length is checked if it is greater than
a% of the queue limit. If so, the enqeued packet is dropped immediately; otherwise, the
enqeued packet is treated normally.
The proposed strategy is a preemptive strategy to prevent the attack packets from
gaining access to the legitimate bandwidth. It can be empirically confirmed that the point
after which the queue length exceeds a% of the queue limit will occur only during the
attack epochs as the legitimate TCP flows will try to share bandwidth, and the attack
packets will typically try to force the legitimate packets out of the queue once the
occurrence of the attack is confirmed by the proposed attack detection algorithm.
Nevertheless, under no attack during congestion, the legitimate flows can force other
legitimate packets to be dropped, but in the RoQ attack case, they are most likely RoQ
attack packets, and hence these packets are dropped. The filtering is also activated at the
approximate time instants for one second when attack packets start arriving at the queue.
Filtering is done for one sec because the attack detection algorithm runs every one
second. The time period of the attack can be obtained from the attack detection algorithm.
This idea is the essence of the proposed attack-filtering algorithm. A tradeoff exists in
choosing the percentage of the queue limit for dropping the packets; this will decide how
much attack traffic will be dropped as well as the penalty imposed on the legitimate
short-lived and long-lived flows. The percentage value will be determined empirically;
details will be provided in a later Section. One advantage of this approach is that too
many legitimate short flows traversing the router need not be isolated as it is difficult to
implement per-flow logic in hardware, and the difficulties involved will be discussed
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more in the next Section on hardware implementation strategies. The short-lived flows
will get enough share of the total capacity as just (100 - a)% of the buffer space is denied
untill the RoQ attack is filtered. However, some of the packets of the new short flows
will be dropped, but they will be admitted after a few milliseconds when the attack burst
has subsided. A normal TCP connection uses the exponential backoff algorithm to resend
the dropped packets before giving up. In addition, the RoQ attack packets are enqueued
less frequently, e.g., every 5 seconds, and so few legitimate short-lived TCP traffic,
which lost packets, can easily enter slow start and increase their congestion windows,
which were halved due to lost packets, to send data before the next attack burst occurs. In
fact, most of the short-lived flows last less than two seconds, and so they will finish
sending data during the slow start phase before the next attack burst occurs.
One more advantage from the implementation perspective as compared to the
traditional filtering is that no memory is needed to store the list of the IP addresses to be
dropped. The hardware implementation issue with per flow states will be discussed in the
next section where it becomes clear why it is difficult to preserve per flow state at high
speeds for all the flows. Thus, the proposed filtering solution is simple and effective.
Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed filtering technique in
dropping a significant number of attack packets while simultaneously provisioning the
legitimate traffic enough bandwidth. The attack filtering can be stopped after having
confirmed the no attack status by using the attack detection algorithm shown in Figure
4.2. The scheme has a drawback when used to filter the low rate DoS attack traffic,
because the low rate DoS attack has a small-time period as compared to those of the RoQ
attacks, and hence the attack packets are enqueued more frequently. The queue length
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exceeds a% of the queue limit more often, thus leading to higher drops of the legitimate
packets. The legitimate short-lived traffic is penalized, and it suffers from reduction in
throughput.

4.3 Implementation Discussion
Internet security is vital to facilitate e-commerce transactions, and there has been
continued research effort to provision network traffic monitoring at high speeds. The
hardware capabilities achieved by some other approaches like the deep packet inspection
[73], at relatively low speeds show that the proposed approach can be realizable. The fast
memory, i.e., SRAM, is exorbitantly costly, and the cheap memory, i.e., DRAM, is too
slow to work at the high speed line rates, which are two critical considerations in
provisioning high speed monitoring.
In this Section, some of the recent techniques proposed in the literature that can
facilitate realization of the proposed detection system architecture are discussed. To
estimate the size of the benign flow table, commonly used Internet traces are considered
for analysis [74] - [76]. The ISP trace at 0C48 speed used in [74] contains 11,341,289
flows. To maintain per-flow states for so many flows is difficult as the majority of the
flows are short-lived leading to continuous updates and removal of flows from the
memory. The high-speed memory SRAM which can support such operation is
exorbitantly costly. Considering the previously described characteristics of the Internet
traffic, approximately one-third (3,780,429) of the flows are the large flows. It is difficult
to maintain per flow state for all the flows because of resource constraints. By using a
bloom filter calculator [77], the amount of memory (SRAM) required for maintaining the
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entry of each flow in a bloom filter for approximately 3,780,429 flows with the
probability of false positive of 0.001 and four hash functions is two MB. Note that these
are not live flows at one instant, but the total number of flows found in the entire trace. In
another work [78], the authors pointed out that the maximum number of live flows is
714,166 in another OC-48 trace for which the size of the bloom filter is 1.8MB using the
same parameters as before. Thus, the benign flow table has a modest memory
requirement of about two MB.
Apart from the memory requirement for the benign flow table, the proposed
detection system also needs per flow size estimation module like Cisco Netflow and
hence additional resources are needed for the per flow size estimation module. However,
the additional resources for the per flow size estimation module are already included in
the routers. The benign flow table represents the additional requirement if the proposed
system is deployed at a router. -

4.4 Simulation Results

The ns2 simulator is used to demonstrate the performance of the proposed detection
scheme. The topology used in the experiment is shown in Figure 4.7. Packmime HTTP
traffic generator was used; it was developed by using the real traces of the Internet traffic.
This is the most recent work about the modeling of the HTTP traffic that improves over
the previous HTTP traffic models. The packmime traffic model was adopted in this study
because the HTTP traffic interaction with the detection system is important since an
attack flow using the IP address spoofing or botnets would have a similar number of
packets like in a typical HTTP flow or a short-lived flow. The topology consists of two
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PackMime clients, two PackMime servers connected by 100Mbps links to the delaybox,
and two routers with a buffer size of 500 packets each, and a bottleneck link of 10Mbps
between them. The queue size is fixed and is equal to twice the delay bandwidth product,
which was found to perform optimally for routers in the Internet. The link between the
delaybox and the router is 100Mbps. The delaybox is used to provide per flow dropping
probability, round-trip times, and bottleneck link speeds. In the experiment setting, the
dropping probability is zero and the available server bandwidth is uniformly distributed
from 1 to 20 Mbps.

Figure 4.7 The simulation topology.
The test-packmime-delaybox.tcl script [42] was modified for the simulations. All the
access links have random delays obtained by using a uniform distribution from 50250ms. The access links connecting to the sink agents and the bottleneck link has link
delay of 10ms. Ten long-lived flows simulating FTP are used in the network. The details
of the SACK TCP used in the simulations are: window size 50 packets, segment size
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1460, minimum RTO one second for the FTP flows, and the rest of the parameters are the
default settings. The TCP of the packmime model also adopts the SACK TCP; other
details are the same as that of the TCP used for FTP. Five VoIP flows modeled as G711
FEC 96Kbps traffic using the exponential on-off traffic model in ns2 are part of the
network traffic. The attacker uses UDP constant bit rate traffic (CBR). The proposed
detection system code is embedded in the AVQ algorithm of ns2, and the detection
system is invoked when the virtual capacity exceeds the AVQ-defined threshold. It is
invoked by the congestion signal from the AVQ algorithm. The simulation was executed
for 650 seconds with a warm up time of 50 seconds; the attack was introduced 50 seconds
later after the start of the simulation. The packmime connection rate was 40 connections
per second, i.e., 40 new HTTP connections would start every second. The rate value of 40
is used because it generates the average throughput of 30% of the bottleneck link in
absence of any other traffic on the bottleneck link in the simulation setup. It also
conforms to the reported nature of the Internet traffic, in which many short-lived flows
occupy around 30% of traffic in bytes, and the rest is occupied by the long-lived flows.
About 14000 connections were generated during the lifetime of the simulation. The
detection system code uses the flowid field available in ns2 to implement the per-flow
logic. In practice, the flow-id will have to be replaced by the hash of the source IP
address, the destination IP address, the source port, and the destination port.
Initially, the ability of the attack detection algorithm to detect the low rate DoS
and the RoQ attack is demonstrated. The attack threshold is set as explained in Figure 4.2
to be 312.5KB close to the value of C/4, and was tested with two attack scenarios: 1)
T=1s, t=0.3s, and R=10Mbps (low rate DoS attack), and 2) T=5s, t=0.3s, and R=10Mbps
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(RoQ attack). One representative SUM value in absence of the attack is 88.85 KB, and it
never exceeds the threshold of 312.5KB throughout the simulation. In attack scenario 1,
the SUM values are 391.3KB at 50.8s, 425.7KB at 51.8s, 390.6KB at 52.8s, 393.9KB at
53.8s, and so on. In attack scenario 2, the SUM values are 391.3KB at 50.8s, 375.6KB at
55.8s, 371.7KB at 60.8s, and so on. Thus, clearly in both cases, the SUM value exceeds
the threshold, thus indicating the presence of the low rate DoS and RoQ attack at the
router, respectively.
In this simulation, the attacker uses random IP address spoofing with the time
period of 5 seconds, the burst period of 0.3 second, and the burst rate of 10Mbps. The
proposed detection system detects the RoQ attack as explained in the attack detection
algorithm. As shown in Figure 4.8, the throughput for the long-lived flows is restored to
almost that of the case with no attack. Apparently, flow 4 was not affected by the attack;
it is conjectured that the attack packets could not force timeout during the burst period as
the RTT was large, and hence the flow did not suffer from reduction in throughput. In
addition, during the attack, flow 4 achieved higher throughput because other flows were
suffering from reduction in throughput.

Figure 4.8 The throughput comparison under an RoQ attack.
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Figure 4.9 VoIP packet loss comparison under an RoQ attack.
In Figure 4.9, it can be seen that VoIP flows do not experience any packet loss
with the use of the detection system. The VoIP flow is classified as a benign long-lived
flow as it is active for more than two seconds. A study by a VoIP carrier network vendor
Nextone has reported the average VoIP call length to be around 9 minutes in one of their
February 2005 case study [79]. For the RoQ attack with the time-period of 5 seconds, the
value of a is kept to be 80 because above that leads to loss of throughput to the legitimate
long-lived flows in the benign flow table. The value of a can be higher than 50% for the
RoQ attack filtering as the attack packets enter the network less frequently; this concurs
with many of demonstrated simulations. In Figures 4.10-4.12, the statistics of each HTTP
flow generated during the simulation obtained from the packmime program are shown.
The x-axis is the response size in bytes of the replies from the server, and the y-axis is the
response time between client sending HTTP request and client receiving complete HTTP
response in seconds. The average value of the response time in the no attack case is l.8s,
that with the detection system is 2.3s, and that with the attack is l.2s. The standard
deviation of the response time in the no attack case is 1.3s, that with the detection system
is 2.2s, and that with the attack is 1.3s. In the attack case, the HTTP performance is
better because the long-lived flows are suffering from losses and their bandwidth is
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claimed by HTTP flows. In comparing the case with no attack and that with detection
system, it is observed that the average response time increases by 0.5s and the standard
deviation of the response time increases by 0.9s with the detection system. Thus, the
legitimate clients are not denied service when the proposed detection system is employed;
however, there is a slight increase in the response time.

Figure 4.10 HTTP performance under no attack.

Figure 4.11 Restoration of HTTP performance.

Figure 4.12 HTTP performance under an RoQ attack.

Figure 4.13 The throughput comparison under an RoQ attack with
continuous cycle IP address spoofing.

Experiments were conducted on simulating an attacker by using continuous cycle IP
address spoofing in which a new IP address is used for every ON period. In the
simulation, an attacker sends approximately 500, 5K, 10K, 15K, and 20K packets, each
of size 210bytes, to fill up the bottleneck link during the ON period of 10ms, 110ms,
210ms, 310ms, and 410ms, respectively. The attacker in this scenario sends 4K packets
with a new IP address every ON period. The time period was kept 5 seconds, the burst
period 0.3 second, and the burst rate 10Mbps for the RoQ attack, and all other simulation
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parameters were exactly the same as those in previous simulations but with a variant of
continuous IP address spoofing instead of random IP address spoofing. The results are
shown in Figure 4.13. It can be observed that the throughput of the legitimate long-lived
flows is restored, and a significant number of attack packets are dropped by using the
proposed detection system. The proposed architecture facilitates identification and
filtering of the RoQ attack traffic in which IP address spoofing is instigated. The
proposed approach thus addresses most of the issues where RED-PD and several other
approaches fail to defend against RoQ attacks.

4.5 A Different Approach to Filter Attack Traffic
This section describes the proactive test based differentiation technique (PTDT) in detail
for filtering the low rate DoS attack traffic. Figure 4.14 shows the block diagram of the
system. The detection algorithm is the same as defined in Section 4.2.

Figure 4.14 The new filtering system block diagram.
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The detection and mitigation system will operate at routers primarily at the edges of a
network, so that all the traffic entering the network can be examined by the system. The
low rate DoS attack detection algorithm requires the per flow information of the traffic
passing through an edge router. A flow or flow id is defined as a 4-tuple of the source IP
address, the source port, the destination IP address, and the destination IP port. The flow
size estimation module will provide the necessary per-flow information of the network
traffic passing through the router to the low rate DoS attack detection algorithm.
Incoming packets are enqueued in the outgoing queue of the router if the PTDT module
is not ON. PTDT is activated if the low rate DoS attack detection algorithm detects a low
rate DoS attack. Once activated, PTDT allows legitimate traffic to pass through the
router, but blocks the attack traffic. The detailed functioning of the PTDT module is
explained further. After the low rate DoS attack is detected, PTDT is activated. PTDT
also leverages on the fact that TCP traffic is dominant in the Internet. Figure 4.15 shows
the flowchart of the PTDT module. On arrival of a SYN packet, the PTDT module knows
that it belongs to a new flow and sends a puzzle to the source of the packet. The
technique of using visual puzzles or CAPTCHA's in the proposed system is similar to
several proposals used to distinguish humans from the attack machines [80]. The user is
admitted by the system after having given the correct answer of the puzzle. This way,
PTDT can stop an attacker who can send SYN packets to launch a low rate DoS attack,
and still allow the legitimate users to access the network. The technique of introducing a
puzzle will also confirm that a human user, rather than an automated attack machine, is
initiating the communications, and so the flow after having been admitted to the system
will follow the standard protocol.
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The remaining steps in the flowchart for an old flow will typically verify the behavior of
the flow over a period of time before being classified as benign. Functions of the
remaining blocks of the flowchart are explained hereafter, which are similar to the
original proposal described in [81]. The two counters fail num and pass_num achieve a
balance between the conservative and aggressive approach against individual flows. A
flow is allowed to prove its innocence by failing no more than a certain number of tests
maintained by the fail_num counter; otherwise, it is dropped. Similarly, a good flow after
having passed a certain number of tests maintained by the pass num counter is trusted as
innocent, and is not required to take further tests. Then, the PTDT module checks the
current state of the flow; for a flow under test, its current rate should not exceed its
previous rate. This can be achieved by dropping a single data packet, so that the
legitimate TCP flow will reduce its sending rate. The attack flows will not reduce their
rates, and thus can be distinguished. If a flow passes this test, its pass_num value is
increased by one, and vice versa. The default values of various thresholds like certain
numbers of tests that can be failed, though are applications specific, can be kept the same
as in the original proposal [81]. Another advantage of using these proactive tests is to
detect intelligent attackers who can overcome CAPTCHA's by using intelligent image
recognition software's [82].
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Figure 4.15 The PTDT module's flowchart.

Thus, by employing the PTDT module, the legitimate TCP traffic can still access the
network in the presence of the low rate DoS attack. The PTDT module can also monitor
the rates of some common UDP applications like VoIP and Video traffic, and if the rates
conform to the standard application rates, then these flows can also be admitted into the
network. Proposals such as CYSEP [73], which perform complex network security
operations like encryption/decryption and intrusion detection at gigabit speeds, can be
easily modified to implement the PTDT module. Currently, the entire detection system
can work at network edges where such tasks can be performed by using a combination of

74
different hardware implementations. It can be typically suitable for medium and smallsized networks, which host web servers.

4.6 Simulation Results of New Filtering System
Preliminary investigation to validate the proposed detection and mitigation system was
done by using the ns2 simulator. The well-known dumbbell topology network was used
with a single bottleneck link of 10Mbps. The access links were 100Mbps with random
delays on each link to simulate varying roundtrip-time for each connection. The network
traffic consisted of ten FTP flows and one attack flow. The FTP traffic used TCP sack
with a window size of 43 packets, segment size 1460bytes, and the other parameters with
default values. The attack flow was UDP constant bit rate traffic with the burst period of
0.4s, the burst rate of 15Mbps, and the time period of one second. The attack traffic was
using random IP address spoofing. In the ns2 simulations, puzzles were not served before
the connections were established, and so it was assumed that the FTP connections had
solved the puzzles. It is decided to implement this functionality in the future on a Linux
prototype of the detection system. Proactive tests were imposed on these connections to
verify their legitimacy. Figure 4.16 shows the throughput of the legitimate FTP flows
under different scenarios. Note that the throughput is restored back by using the detection
and mitigation system. Figure 4.17 shows the sending rate of a legitimate flow with and
without the proactive test, respectively. Typically, the legitimate flow that uses a stock
TCP should reduce its rate after its packet is dropped. An attack flow will not obey the
stock protocol which was shown in the original PTDT; this was reinforced by
simulations. The contribution of this new filtering system has been augmenting the PTDT
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approach with the low rate DoS attack detection algorithm to mitigate the low rate DoS
attacks orchestrated through botnets.

Figure 4.16 Throughput of the legitimate FTP flows.

Figure 4.17 A proactive test demonstration on a legitimate FTP flow.

4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a router-based approach is proposed to detect the low rate DoS and RoQ
attacks which use IP address spoofing or botnets. This work addresses the IP address
spoofing and botnet problem in the context of the low rate DoS and RoQ attacks, and
proposes an effective and realizable solution to defend against these attacks. The
effectiveness of the proposed approach has been demonstrated via extensive experiments.

CHAPTER 5
A QUIET DDOS ATTACK

5.1 Quiet Attack Basics
In this chapter, a new low rate attack model is proposed. This work will hopefully help
stimulate development to mitigate existing vulnerabilities before they may be exploited.
The war against attackers will be won only if the white hat community stays ahead of the
attackers. This work describes an attack that has the potential to disrupt the Internet
which has become an integral part of economic, social, and political activities of any
nation.
The proposed model uses the TCP protocol to launch the attack. TCP is
considered to be a network adaptive protocol, and widely contributes to the current
Internet traffic. The attack has the ability to disguise itself as a normal traffic, thereby
making detection difficult. It relies on using readily available botnets to send the attack
traffic. Botnets are formed at an alarming rate today because of increasing vulnerabilities
in various software applications. The users of these applications are often common folks
who are not security conscious, thus leaving their systems exposed to exploitations.
Social engineering attacks are also used to increase the bot population. Thus, all these
conditions lead to the breeding ground for rogues to develop new attacks. The basic
attack model is explained along with effects of the attack on a single TCP flow. The
attack exploits the effect of short-lived TCP flows on other TCP flows. A TCP flow
strictly adheres to the congestion control algorithms like slow start and congestion
avoidance. A long-lived TCP flow is typically known to enter and end in the congestion
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avoidance phase while a short-lived TCP flow to end in the slow start phase. In the quiet
attack model, a set of short-lived TCP flows are started so that the aggregate attack traffic
rate is approximately proportional to the link capacity under attack, and subsequently
after every short time period T, a new set of short-lived TCP flows are injected to the
network. A TCP flow rate is congestion dependent unlike a UDP flow, and so the exact
rate cannot be imposed by using TCP as an attack flow. A botmaster will use capacity
estimation techniques like capprobe [83] to approximate the link capacity. During this
process, the available bandwidth is monitored by using tools like abget [84] or pathchirp
[85], and is not allowed to increase. The time period T is kept random between Os and 1s
to remove any deterministic pattern. In fact, the time period is designed to look
continuous. The available bandwidth remains negligible that leads to congestion at the
router queue, and as the queue fills up, packets at the queue end are dropped by the
droptail queue mechanism, i.e., any packet can be dropped as there is no preferential
treatment given to any packet. As a legitimate long-lived TCP flow times out and enters
the slow start phase, the congestion window is reduced, thus reducing the sending rate
and throughput. The persistent congestion in the queue forces random packet drops of the
legitimate long-lived TCP flows, thus affecting the throughput each time a packet is
dropped. The attack concept is simple: keep the available bandwidth negligible by
sending enough short-lived TCP flows.
The quiet attack exploits shortcomings of the end to end window flow control
[86], which shows that if the number of connections increases, then delay or congestion
will roughly increase proportionally to the number of connections or more precisely to
the sum of window sizes of all connections. The basic trade off in end to end window
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flow control mechanism is selecting the right window size which is a well studied
difficult problem. TCP initially does not know the network congestion state, and so it
uses slow start in the beginning to increase the window size exponentially; this, however,
gives unfair advantage to short-lived TCP flows in the quiet attack when other legitimate
TCP flows are waiting for transmission in the stage of retransmission timeout. In this
attack, short-lived flows are sent persistently that subsequently lead to considerable
reduction in throughput.
The major threat of the attack model is to provide false impression of the attack as
a "congestion scenario". Previous studies have considered effects of short-lived flows on
other Internet traffic with the assumption that they occupy less volume of the total
capacity although they are large in numbers. By using botnets in sending short-lived TCP
flows during an attack, such Internet traffic assumptions can no longer be true.

5.2 Quiet Attack Execution in the Internet
5.2.1 Quiet Attack Reconnaissance Phase
The attack execution of the quiet attack model involves network reconnaissance and
finally execution. The network reconnaissance involves deciding a router to be attacked,
a botnet to be used, and gathering a list of web servers. It is assumed an attacker has
access to a botnet which is formed by capitalizing on latest exploits. Active bots in a
botnet are typically concentrated in the same time zone [3], and such group of bots will
participate in the quiet attack. The next step is to determine which router to launch the
attack that involves the botmaster issuing a command to the active bots to initiate a
simple command like "tracert www.bu.edu" which will trace the path from the bot to the
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bu website. The tracert command even works for users with limited access or nonadministrative accounts on windows XP and Vista. All bots then send the output of the
tracert to the botmaster. An edge router whose IP address is observed in all the tracert
outputs becomes a target for attack by the botmaster. It is assumed that each time zone
will have few big ISPs; for example, there are Verizon, Comcast and AT&T in the
eastern standard time zone. The big ISPs have a few transit points from which the traffic
enters the Internet backbone. Such transit points of big ISPs will be the targets of the
quiet attack. Espionage during a cyber war or stealing confidential information of ISPs
can be another way in which an IP address of a router to be attacked can be found. To
discover routers to be attacked, an attacker can also use a network mapping technique by
using open source tools like cartoreso [87] or traceroute.
The last step is collecting web servers that could be attacked. The major
component of the attack traffic is short-lived flows, and so an attacker needs web servers
from which bots could request files via HTTP. It is assumed that bots can exploit a
CAPTCHA or use websites that do not employ CAPTCHA [88]. There are simple scripts
that can estimate the size of web pages [89]. A botmaster can set a limit of the web page
size between 100KB and 1MB for a bot to request. A larger number of web servers will
allow a sparser distribution of the attack traffic. This would make attack traffic realistic
and evade detection from systems which target sudden increase in the traffic to a
destination address. An attacker should avoid websites which use CDNs as it could lead
to packets going to proxy web servers at the edges of ISPs. The largest CDN provider
akamai claims to carry 20% of web traffic, i.e., 80% of web traffic does not pass through
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akamai. Most of the government websites, university websites, and small websites cannot
afford CDNs.

5.2.2 Quiet Attack Execution Phase
Under normal circumstances, most of the DSL download rates are in the range of 1-2
Mbps for a typical home customer. Now, consider an OC 192 (10Gbps) link under the
attack. To fill up 10Gbps, 20,000 bots should be online, assuming each sending at the
minimal rate of 500Kbps. In the Internet, there are easily around millions of websites,
and so it can be assumed that a botmaster uses 20,000 websites in the quiet attack. The
webpages (p) of websites (W) used in the attack are accessed by 20,000 bots as shown in
the Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Webpage request strategy in a quiet attack.

Thus, every second each website only experiences one webpage worth of traffic which is
clearly non-anomalous for any IDS at the website. For a signature based IDS at a router,
there is nothing anomalous in packet contents or patterns. For an anomaly based IDS at a
router, there is nothing anomalous if such a traffic pattern consisting of so many unique
flows is occurring daily. Typically, there are millions of web flows like the attack shortlived TCP flows passing daily via a major router of any ISP. If an attacker has more than
20,000 websites, then the quiet attack can become much more difficult to be tracked and
detected at the router.
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While launching this attack, a botmaster will need network feedback on the amount of
traffic at the target link. To get network feedback, a botmaster can use a tool like abget.
The botmaster will initiate new bot requests at every interval T depending upon the
network feedback. The network feedback is useful if ISPs do load sharing so that the
botmaster can sense the condition of congestion, and add more bots to send additional
attack traffic. Available bandwidth of more than 1000bps for more than 5mins is
considered to be a threshold to add more attack short-lived TCP flows. A botmaster will
re-use capacity estimation techniques like capprobe to approximate the size of the
bottleneck link to adjust the number of bots. ISPs typically do not use dynamic load
sharing techniques as it leads to some negative effects although they can advertise
different CIDR blocks to peering ISPs for load sharing using BGP [9]. The attack model
can be summarized as an algorithm, as shown in Fig. 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Quiet DDoS attack algorithm.
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5.3 Simulation Results
Ns2 is used to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack model. The dumbbell
topology is used to focus on the bottleneck queue, and a provision is also facilitated to
modify parameters such as the access link bandwidth, the delay, and the number of
clients and servers. The bottleneck link has a capacity of C=10 Mbps and each of the
access links has a capacity of 100 Mbps. The link delay of the client-side access links is
uniformly distributed between 50 and 100ms to simulate the varying roundtrip-time for
each connection; all other links have a delay of 10ms. The router has a simple droptail
queue with size equal to 500 packets; following the specification that the buffer size
should be twice that of the delay bandwidth product. The legitimate traffic consists of
five FTP flows and HTTP traffic which is generated by PackMime in ns2. The HTTP
traffic rate of 40 connections/sec is used to generate an average traffic of approximately
30% of the bottleneck link. Thus, the legitimate traffic contains the mix of short-lived and
long-lived flows that is found in the Internet where measurements show that short-lived
flows account for 30-40% of the traffic volume (in bytes), and the rest is occupied by
long-lived flows. In the absence of the attack, the available bandwidth at the bottleneck
queue is always negligible.
The attack traffic consists of a set of 20 ftp flows, each transferring a small file of
size 750KB to simulate bots accessing webpages. These attack flows are introduced at
every interval of T from different nodes, thus simulating bots of a botnet. The time period
T is kept random between Os and 1 s to remove the deterministic pattern. To simulate a
real botnet, nodes are simulated as zombies at 1, 2, 3, and 4 hops away from the target
router. Each of the nodes has variable access link delays to the target router. Pathchirp is
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used to gather the available bandwidth at the bottleneck. The effect of attack traffic on ftp
flows is shown in Figure 5.3. The throughput of ftp flows is reduced by almost 70% when
there is attack. It was observed that the quiet attack does not affect the web traffic
significantly due to lack of burstiness, but it is conjectured that increasing more shortlived flows can be damaging. This investigation is left as part of the future work.

Figure 5.3 Effect of Quiet DDoS attack on throughput.
Experiments show that the quiet attack cannot be mitigated by adaptive queue
management system like AVQ since the attack traffic adapts to the network congestion
which is a property of the TCP protocol. The throughput of long-lived flows under AVQ
is shown in Figure 5.3. The aggregate congestion control scheme pushback was also used
to mitigate the quiet attack. The pushback scheme also failed because the attack traffic
uses TCP and network feedback. For the pushback scheme, a slightly different topology
with four routers between sources and sinks was used. The network traffic was composed
of a legitimate TCP flow and the attack traffic. The throughput of the TCP flow was 277
Kbps with the attack and pushback scheme, and it was 954Kbps without the attack.
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5.4 Existing Attack Models
The new breed of DoS attacks such as Shrew attacks and RoQ attacks rely on sending
high rate UDP traffic periodically. Their deterministic periodic pattern and high rate
make them detectable, and several detection systems have been proposed including
contributions of this dissertation discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. TCP vs TCP attack [12]
is similar to the shrew attack, but it uses short-lived TCP flows instead of UDP. It suffers
from the same issues of sudden high rate and deterministic periodic attack pattern. Thus,
in a Shrew and a RoQ attack, an attacker sends traffic at a rate equal to the target capacity
to induce packet drops while the proposed quiet attack does not impose such requirement
on the aggregate attack rate, thereby making the traffic less bursty. A typical DDoS attack
sending high rate UDP, ICMP or TCP SYN packets continuously can affect web traffic,
but these attacks can be detected by detection systems like pushback. DDoS attacks such
as the SYN attack have distinguishable traffic characteristics like abnormal quantities of
SYN packets as compared to normal traffic. ICMP and UDP attack traffic can be easily
detected as they normally occupy a small percentage of the regular traffic as compared to
the TCP traffic. The proposed sophisticated quiet attack model based on reconnaissance
and execution is unique, and is adapted to be legitimate-like. Since no single server is
under constant attack, the web servers are kept in the dark while ISPs who manage
routers are made to believe that their routers are under real congestion. Finally, the
simulation and comparison results demonstrate that the proposed attack model performs
better than other attack models which have been reported in the literature so far in terms
of evading detection.
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5.5 Summary

In this chapter, a new DDoS attack model was proposed by using botnets that is evadable
and can be easily mistaken as real congestion. The proposed quiet attack model
incorporates several novel tactics to evade detection. The defense mechanisms for botnet
mitigation, such as better CAPTCHAs, are an important part of the defense strategy
against the quiet attack.

CHAPTER 6
THE PERFECT STORM

6.1 Attack Model Design Philosophy
This chapter describes the perfect attack model, which is a variant of quiet attack model
described in the previous Chapter. The attack is first described by the scenario shown in
Figure 6.1: a botnet with potentially millions of zombies sending data towards a target, in
this case a router. One zombie acts as the botmaster m to coordinate the attack traffic of n
zombies in the botnet. The bottleneck router is located at the server-side edge of the
server that is assumed to be under a DDoS attack. The capacity of the outgoing link of the
router is denoted as C, and the available bandwidth at a given time t is denoted as B(t) .

Figure 6.1 The network model.
Three innovative concepts towards designing the perfect attack are outlined,
which distinguishes the perfect attack from existing sophisticated attacks:
•

Use TCP along with a small amount of UDP traffic as the attack traffic.

•

Incorporate network feedback mechanism in the attack process.

•

Distribute the attack sources by using botnets to launch the attack.
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The proposed attack model consists of two parts: an initial, short, deterministic high-rate
pulse, and a feedback-driven sustained attack period with a network-adaptive attack rate,
as depicted in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 Attack traffic for a perfect DDoS attack.
To fulfill the above criteria, a perfect attack is envisioned to be executed as follows. The
attack traffic is injected from a botnet towards a target with a bottleneck queue as
described in Figure 6.2. Initially, a high-rate pulse is sent at a rate r for a duration of
that overflows the buffer such that all packets are dropped. This pulse is similar to a
shrew pulse, with the main difference that it only occurs at the beginning, once or twice,
to drop all the packets in the queue. Thus, after this pulse, it is assumed that all long-lived
TCP flows are in a timeout state, and thus do not send traffic. The only legitimate traffic
that arrives immediately after the pulse is flows that are being established.
Thus, in the phase after the pulse, the attacker must fill the bottleneck queue with its own
traffic as fast as possible and to sustain this level. Ideally, this filling ensures that only a
small fraction of legitimate packets ever passes the bottleneck. Such a high drop rate per
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flow implies that (i) a large number of SYN packets are dropped, (ii) TCP flows
experience packet loss already in slow start, and (iii) other non-TCP traffic incurs
significant packet loss. Thus, in this second phase, the attack traffic is sent according to
the following pattern. Denote B(t) as the available bandwidth at the bottleneck and C as
the link capacity of the attack target link. Then, the sustained attack traffic N(t) is:

Under the assumption that all or the vast majority of the bottleneck bandwidth is
consumed by the attack traffic, Equation (6.1) aims at maintaining a steady consumption.
This attack traffic is the TCP traffic at a rate equivalent to the link capacity C . To fill the
bottleneck and to compensate for drops in the TCP attack rate, UDP traffic at a rate of
B(t) is injected into the network. Note here that the UDP traffic is a function of the

available bandwidth rather than the capacity as in a shrew attack or a RoQ attack. N(t) is
periodically updated and adjusted with the time period T . The update contains a rate
adaptation but also the chance to exchange the zombies in the attack to create a diverse
traffic pattern from different traffic sources. Thus, at the bottleneck, N(t) creates a traffic
pattern consisting of a superposition of many TCP flows, with a small fraction of UDP
traffic, whose sources vary over time. After each period T , a new set of TCP flows are
directed at the bottleneck link. These TCP flows begin in the slow start phase of TCP and
end in the slow start phase as well. It is important to keep the attack TCP flows in slow
start because they have been shown to affect long-lived TCP flows on shorter timescales,
and also introducing a new TCP connection allows the congestion window to grow
rapidly, otherwise attack TCP flows will enter congestion avoidance phase and will try to
share the bandwidth with the legitimate TCP flows. The period T can be random so as to
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make detection difficult particularly for systems that try to find the deterministic attack
pattern. Note that this interplay between TCP and UDP further complicates the detection.
In contrast to the shrew attack where the repetitive pulses can be relatively detected, the
perfect attack does not create such a repetitive pattern. Instead, the dynamics lead to an
ever changing traffic pattern that cannot be observed and captured by the defense. In
comparison between a normal TCP vs. a TCP attack [12], besides the non-determinism,
the perfect attack monitors the bottleneck and injects traffic at a specific target rate to
achieve a high impact. The TCP vs. TCP attack [12] cannot launch an attack on a
bottleneck link as it relies on TCP which cannot force other packets to be dropped, but in
the proposed attack model with the minimal use of UDP traffic, higher impact can be
achieved at any link irrespective of its congestion state. In the perfect attack, more attack
traffic is sent as compared to a shrew attack or an RoQ attack, but the shrew and RoQ
attacks rely on UDP traffic to cause damage and the proposed model relies on network
adaptive TCP traffic. In Section 6.3, it is shown that the TCP attack traffic is legitimate
web requests, and is thus even more difficult to be detected.
In summary, the perfect DDoS attack can be visualized as a superposition of
many attack flows, as seen in Figure 6.2. All attack parameters can be dynamically
adjusted based on the feedback gathered during the attack. Therefore, the attack shows no
deterministic pattern that can be captured by a defense mechanism. Moreover, the
feedback and the primary use of TCP, with intermittent UDP fillings, ensure that the
attack leads to a denial of service and not just a degradation of quality as in RoQ attacks.
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6.2 Simulation Results
This section evaluates the impact of the perfect attack via simulations. In particular, the
impact of the perfect attack on legitimate user traffic is evaluated. Simulations were
conducted to compare the impact of the perfect attack with the situation where there is no
attack as well as against the shrew and RoQ attacks. A small proof-of-concept experiment
is demonstrated that validates the idea of using short-lived TCP flows against long-lived
TCP flows as the attack flows in the perfect attack model described in the earlier section.
A simple dumbbell topology is used in ns-2 with a legitimate long-lived TCP flow and
the perfect attack flows. The bottleneck link has a capacity of C =1 Mbps, and each of
the access links has a bandwidth of 10 Mbps. Two initial bursts are sent at the rate of

r =1 Mbps for a period of 0.4 sec. Then, the attack traffic consists of the feedback-based
attack cycle with an attack rate of N(t) as defined in Equation (6). The N(t) consists of
a long-lived TCP flow in case 1, and a short-lived TCP flow in case 2 sent at random
intervals. Case 3 does not contain the perfect attack. The throughput of the legitimate
TCP flow is 558Kbps, 158Kbps, and 970 Kbps in case 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This
proof-of-concept experiment shows that the use of short-lived TCP flows is an important
condition to achieve the desired impact.
For the detailed analysis, the simulation settings for the dumbbell topology are as
follows. This topology allows us to focus on the bottleneck queue, but it still provides the
ability to modify parameters such as the access link bandwidth, the delay, and the number
of clients, servers, and zombies. The bottleneck link has a capacity of C =10 Mbps, and
each of the access links has a bandwidth of 100 Mbps. The link delays of the client-side
access links follow a uniform distribution in the range of 50 to 100ms to simulate the
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varying roundtrip-time for each connection; all other links have a delay of 10ms. The
router has a simple droptail queue with size equal to 500 packets, following the
specification that the buffer size should be twice that of the delay bandwidth product. The
legitimate traffic consists of 5 FTP flows, 4 VoIP flows, and HTTP traffic generated by
PackMime. The packmime HTTP traffic generator is incorporated in ns-2. During the
600 seconds of the simulation, PackMime generates around 14000 HTTP connections at
the rate of 40 connections per second. The rate of 40 is used to generate an average traffic
of approximately 30% of the bottleneck link. Thus, the legitimate traffic is consistent
with measurements which show short-lived flows account for 30-40% of the traffic
volume (in bytes), and the rest is occupied by long-lived flows. The 4 VoIP flows that are
modeled as G711 codecs with FEC (Forward Error Correction) are sent at a rate of 96
Kbps by using the exponential on-off traffic model. From this host, two initial bursts are
sent at the rate of r =15 Mbps for a period of 0.4 sec. Then, the attack traffic consists of
the feedback-based attack cycle with an attack rate of N (t) .
Given the fact that TCP is used as the primary attack traffic and that the sources are
ideally distributed, the probability of identifying one of the flows as an attacking flow is
very low. To monitor the status of the bottleneck queue and thereby to get an estimate of
the available bandwidth, an active monitoring approach by using pathchirp is chosen. The
available bandwidth measurement will be done by a botmaster in practice. The attack rate
is updated at an interval of T = 1 sec.
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6.2.1 Impact
The impact of the perfect attack on the legitimate traffic is assessed in this Subsection.
Moreover, the perfect attack is compared against the impact of a shrew and RoQ attack.
In particular, for the shrew attack, the burst length is set to 0.4 sec, the burst period is set
to 1 sec, and the attack rate is set to 15 Mbps. For the RoQ attack, the burst length is set
to 0.4 sec, the burst period is set to 7 sec, and the attack rate is set to 15 Mbps.

Figure 6.3 Attack effects on throughput of long lived TCP flows.

93
6.2.2 Impact on long-lived FTP flows
Impact on the 5 long-lived elephant FTP flows is analyzed in this Subsection. Figure 6.3
shows that the average throughput of each flow in kbps. Without an attack, the
throughput varies between 1.6 and 2.2 Mbps as a function of the RTT between the client
and the server. Using the perfect attack, the throughput of the FTP flows is reduced to a
dismal percentage. The throughput is reduced to less than 200 kbps - a degradation by
more than an order of magnitude as compared to the throughput when no attack is
present. Next, in comparison of the perfect attack to a shrew attack, it is noted that the
throughput is reduced by a factor of 2-3. Finally, the RoQ attack is clearly only reducing
the quality of a long-lived flow, but is far from an efficient DoS attack because the
average throughput is not even degraded by a factor of two as compared to the situation
without an attack. This implies that the perfect attack also reduces the throughput as
compared to an RoQ attack by one order of magnitude.
6.2.3 Impact on VoIP flows
Impact on the VoIP flows is analyzed in this Subsection. The average packet loss, delay,
and jitter are used as metrics to quantify the impact. Figures 6.4-6.6 show the average
packet loss, the delay and the jitter of the 4 VoIP flows as a function of the 4 attack types.
First, without attack, the packet loss rate is 0. With the perfect attack, the packet loss
increases to an average of 20%. In comparison, the shrew attack incurs a packet loss of
18%, and the RoQ attack incurs a packet loss of 3%. Besides the high average packet loss
induced by the perfect attack, a high degree of burstiness was also noted in the packet
loss pattern. Both the high average packet loss rate as well as the burstiness severely
degrade the quality of the voice conversation. Similarly, the perfect attack also leads to
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extremely high delays around 450ms and high jitter values around 80ms for VoIP calls as
shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. Delay of less than 150ms and jitter of less than 20ms are
acceptable for VoIP calls.
6.2.4 Impact on short-lived HTTP flows
Impact on short-lived HTTP flows is evaluated in this Subsection. The packmime web
traffic model provides statistics for the web traffic. It generates requests at an average
rate of 40 connections per second, and the average reply size is 6KBytes.

Figure 6.4 VoIP packet loss.

Figure 6.5 VoIP average one-way delay.
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Figure 6.6 VoIP jitter.
Figure 6.7 quantifies the impact on the response time as a cumulative distributive
function (CDF) plot on a log-scaled x-axis. The response time is measured from the
sending of the request until the reply is successfully received by the client. Figure 6.7
clearly shows that the perfect attack outperforms the other attacks as well as the situation
where no attack is present. As shown in Figure 6.7, the median response time without an
attack is as low as 882 msec. With the perfect attack, it increases to 3148 msec, an almost
4-fold increase. As compared to the other attacks with medians of 1085 msec for the
shrew attack and 750 msec for RoQ attacks, the perfect attack clearly outperforms the
other attacks as well. In particular, the RoQ attacks have no impact on the median
response time as the time is even lower than that without an attack. While looking at the
bare numbers, an increase by a factor of 4 with the perfect attack as compared to no
attack may limit the amount of excitement; the impact becomes obvious when
considering user satisfaction. In particular, user satisfaction is high if Web page
downloads are completed within 5 sec [91]. Now, without attack, 98% of the requests are
completed, whereas only 70% complete with the perfect attack. Even worse, looking at
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the download time of 1 sec, 58% of the pages are successfully downloaded without an
attack, whereas a dismal 10% are completed with the attack.

Figure 6.7 Impact on HTTP flows.

The above evaluation shows that the proposed attack scheme is significantly
reducing the performance of long-lived TCP flows, short-lived TCP flows as well as
VoIP flows. Since these categories occupy the vast majority of traffic in the Internet in
terms of byte volume as well as the number of flows, it is shown that the proposed attack
is highly efficient in denying service to legitimate users. The exact impact must be traded
off against the probability that an attack flow is detected. At this point, it is argued that
the chosen parameters for the perfect attack are far from aggressive. Therefore, a real
attack can easily tune the attack parameter to increase the impact without increasing the
probability of being detected.
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6.2.5 Randomizing T
The effect of randomizing the period of update T of N(T) defined in Section 5.1 is
analyzed here. The parameter, T, determines when the new attack flows should enter the
network. By randomizing T , the attack detection will become more difficult for detection
systems that rely on finding a particular attack pattern. Impact on the long-lived TCP
flows is shown in Figure 6.8. It shows that by choosing a random value between 1s and
6s leads to impact closer to that of T=1s. A little increase in T will naturally decrease
the impact to some degree, but is no way closer to the no attack case in Figure 6.8.

Figure 6.8 Attack effects by randomizing update interval.
6.2.6 Router Defense Mechanisms
The ability of router mechanisms such as Active Queue Management or pushback
schemes to identify and mitigate the effects of the perfect attack is analyzed in this
Subsection. Among the set of proposed AQM schemes, such as RED, RED-PD, and
BLUE, the Adaptive Virtual Queue (AVQ) scheme is used in preliminary studies to
investigate its ability to detect a perfect attack. AVQ is a relatively novel scheme that
outperforms most of the other AQM schemes like RED, and hence it was chosen. To
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assess the impact of AVQ, the simulations above are repeated, but with AVQ enabled.
The adopted parameters are 2 =0.98 and a =0.15. Figure 6.9 compares the throughput
without the attack traffic to that with the perfect attack with AVQ. The results show that
AVQ is unable to mitigate the attack because the perfect attack sends a continuous stream
of attack traffic (in contrast to the shrew bursts), and the traffic volume is comparable to
the available bandwidth. The additional UDP traffic needed to compensate for TCP
.

throughput loss is not sufficient to trigger a reaction by AVQ. The pushback scheme has
also been proposed to mitigate the impact of DDoS attacks, but its approach is different
from AQM. Pushback, also known as aggregate congestion control (ACC), pushes back
DDoS attack traffic from the victim towards the source network of the attack.

Figure 6.9 Impact with AVQ.

Figure 6.10 Topology for pushback simulation.
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To assess the ability of a pushback scheme to defend against the perfect attack,
the simulation topology is modified as depicted in Figure 6.10. In particular, intermediate
routers are necessary to aggregate traffic and to push back potential attack traffic towards
the source. Note, however, that the traffic is sent from a single attacker host only.
Therefore, this scenario should be considered as an upper bound to the effectiveness of
the pushback schemes. In contrast, the perfect attack will be launched from distributed
zombies in a botnet. As for the legitimate traffic, only seven long-lived FTP flows were
used, i.e., while VoIP and HTTP flows were omitted.

Figure 6.11 Impact with pushback.
Figure 6.11 compares the situation without attack to that with the perfect attack. It
is noted that the throughput of the legitimate flows is again severely degraded due to the
attack. Or, in other words, pushback fails to identify the attack traffic because it is
stealthy, i.e., because it follows TCP fairness rules and because network feedback allows
the attack traffic to remain at a low rate.
In summary, preliminary studies have demonstrated the potency of the perfect
attack that can effectively evade existing detection mechanisms.
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6.3 Perfect Attack in the Internet
The tools required to instigate the perfect attack are readily available. A simple traceroute
from publicly available traceroute servers reveals IP addresses of routers along the path
to a web server or any server to be attacked. Bots have been known to engage with web
servers to mimic real web requests to occupy web server's resources like bandwidth and
CPU [80]. Such requests are hard to distinguish, and as Kandula et al. [80] suggested that
the only way to classify a request of a bot from a human is to use some form of a Turing
test like CAPTCHA's. However, CAPTCHA's are not foolproof, and attackers regularly
succeed in breaking new CAPTCHA designs [88]. Many websites, which do not
implement CAPTCHA's like news websites, can be easily attacked.
The execution of the perfect attack will require the use of a botnet similar to the
widely known clickbot [92] used against the Google's ad mechanism to generate false
clicks on a website for a financial fraud. To execute the perfect attack, it is envisioned
such a bot would issue web requests from a web server which is along the path from the
bot to the web server. These web requests are issued by bots at every interval T defined
before in Section 6.2. For every interval T, the botmaster also gets a chance to exchange
the bots in the attack to create a diverse traffic pattern from different traffic sources. In
the perfect attack, such web requests will be short-lived TCP flows acting as the attack
TCP flows. Before an attack begins, an attacker can estimate different sizes of pages that
may be requested, and so a certain amount of throughput is achieved by an individual
TCP flow for a short period of time. Ultimately, the bulk of such requests would
contribute the total amount of the attack TCP traffic. The abget or pathchirp tool
performs the available bandwidth measurement which is done by the botmaster who can
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then instruct bots to just send attack traffic. Active bots in a botnet are shown to be
present in the same time zones, thereby readily available for the attack. The initial UDP
bursts and feedback based attack UDP traffic can be sent from any machine on which a
botmaster has more control.

6.4 Summary
This chapter outlines future potential strategies towards the "perfect" DDoS attack. As
compared to current attacks, the proposed model incorporates several techniques that
allow the attack to be undetectable while achieving the denial of service at the target. The
model includes the exploitation of feedback from the network, the use of a mixture of
TCP and UDP, and the distribution and coordination of entire botnets. Simulation results
have demonstrated the potential lethality of the perfect attack. By making this work
public, this dissertation hopes to inspire others to work on thwarting such a grave threat
that would ultimately benefit the society.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this dissertation, router-based approaches have been proposed to detect the stealthy
low rate DoS and RoQ attacks which use IP address spoofing or botnets. This work
addresses the IP address spoofing and botnet problem in the context of the low rate DoS
and RoQ attacks, and proposes an effective and realizable solution to defend against RoQ
attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been demonstrated via extensive
experiments.
This dissertation have also proposed two new DDoS attack models by using
botnets that are evadable and can be easily mistaken as real congestion. Botnet mitigation
techniques, such as better CAPTCHAs, are an important part of the defense strategy
against the quiet attack and perfect attack. Future work will be focused on building
defenses against such grave threats.
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